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4Abstract:
This  dissertation  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  subjects  of  disagreement,
argument,  and the methodology of  philosophy.  The first  chapter sets  out  and
attempts to answer the question of  what the connection between disagreement
and disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature
of  verbal  disputes.  The  answer  the  chapter  puts  forward  is  that  there  is  a
justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if  there is one) between disagreeing
and disputing, so that, for example, if  two parties do not disagree in the right
way, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look at
a few theories of  verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of  the features such a
theory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of  David Chalmers's
theory of  verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The third
chapter  is  a  defence  of  the  method  of  conceptual  analysis  in  philosophy.  I
introduce some potential  objections  to  the  Canberra  plan  style  of  conceptual
analysis, and show how a different conception of  conceptual analyses could get
over these problems. The conception of  conceptual analysis I argue for is heavily
inspired  by  Rudolf  Carnap's  system  of  explication.  The  main  way  Carnapian
explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of  conceptual analysis is in
the way that it would allow one to move further away from the original concept
in  analysing  it,  by  balancing  closeness  to  the  original  concept  against  other
specific criteria.  
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This  dissertation  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  subjects  of  disagreement,
argument,  and the methodology of  philosophy.  The first  chapter sets  out  and
attempts to answer the question of  what the connection between disagreement
and  disputing  is.  In  other  words,  it  deals  with  the  relation  between  having
incompatible mental states and explicit argument. The answer the chapter puts
forward is that there is a justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if  there is
one) between disagreeing and disputing, so that, for example, if  two parties do
not  disagree  in the  right  way,  then they (prima facie)  should not  dispute.  The
explanation of  this is the conventional acceptance of  a norm rather like resolution:
Resolution:  The  default  purpose  of  disputing  is  the  resolution  of
disagreement.
The extent to which we see a dispute as justified would to some extent reflect the
extent to which it was appropriate for resolving disagreement. 
The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature of  verbal
disputes. In that chapter I will look at a few theories of  verbal disputes, and I will
discuss some of  the features such a theory should have.  I  go on to  explicitly
endorse a version of  David Chalmers's theory of  verbal disputes, and defend it
from some potential objections. My defence of  Chalmers's account centres on his
characterisation  of  verbal  disputes  as  arising  'in  virtue  of'  metalinguistic
6disagreement.
The third chapter is a defence of  the method of  conceptual analysis in
philosophy. I introduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of
conceptual analysis, and show how a different conception of  conceptual analyses
could get over these problems. The conception of  conceptual analysis I argue for
is  heavily  inspired  by  Rudolf  Carnap's  system  of  explication.  The  main  way
Carnapian explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of  conceptual
analysis is in the way that it would allow one to move further away from the
original concept in analysing it.  
These chapters are by and large stand-alone works. However, there is a
common theme running through all three. This is the Chalmers-inspired idea that
it is where a dispute arises from that determines whether it is substantive or not.
A  first  order  dispute  may  be  unjustified  because  it  arises  from  second  order
disagreement.  For  example,  a  first  order  dispute  over  whether  there  was
Champagne served at the wedding may arise from metalinguistic disagreement
over what the word 'Champagne' means, where one disputant takes Prosecco to
count  as  Champagne  and  the  other  doesn't.  In  the  first  chapter  I  argue—
sometimes using intuitions about verbal disputes—that a dispute, in order to be
justified,  must  arise from disagreement  relevant  to it,  and I  explain this  it  by
appealing to our acceptance of  the resolution norm.  In the second chapter I use
these ideas from the first chapter to lend support to Chalmers's account of  verbal
disputes. In the third chapter, one of  the objections I address is that conceptual
analysis is a verbal enterprise, so that the choice between two competing analyses
of  a concept would be a merely verbal one. Part of  the way in which I address
this objection is to appeal to the earlier idea that it is where a particular dispute
arises  from that  determines where it  is  verbal.  I  argue that  if  two conceptual
analysts who dispute over whose analysis is better,  are self  conscious about the
conceptual nature of  their disagreement, then their dispute may be very much




Writers  have  realised  there  is  some  connection  between  disagreeing  and
disputing. Stevenson states in his account of  disagreement that the parties will
not  be  content  to  let  the  attitude  they  disagree  with  go  unchanged  or
unchallenged (1944: 3). Allan Gibbard (2003) argues that holding incompatible
plans is tantamount to disagreement because it can lead to normative discussion
(at least a large part of  this discussion should be considered disputing, broadly
construed, for the people involved are putting forward seemingly incompatible
hypotheses and arguing for them). Mike Ridge attempts to preserve the Gibbard's
idea of  understanding disagreement in terms of  normative discussion in his own
account (2013:  54).  Huw Price states  that  disagreement is the “grounds for a
dispute” (1988: 146). I take it that—implicitly at least—we as occasional disputers
recognise that a dispute without the right kind of  disagreement is unjustified, and
also that if  a dispute arises from some relevant disagreement then generally it is
justified. This should not be controversial. When we notice that two people are
arguing but seem to agree on all relevant matters of  fact—as in a verbal dispute—
we are inclined to point out that their dispute is pointless, rather than substantive.
We are  not  so  inclined  when it  is  clear  that  the  disputants  disagree  over  the
subject of  their argument, for that reason at least.
Although  some  relation  between  disagreement  and  disputes  is
acknowledged by the quoted writers, the precise connection between them has
not  thus  far  been spelled  out  in  much detail.  My intent  in  this  chapter  is  to
explain  this  connection,  and  to  note  some  implications  of  the  explanation  I
favour. I argue that the justificatory relation (or our impression of  one) between
8disagreeing and disputing  comes from our conventional understanding of  the
purpose  of  disputing;  that  disputing  is  for  the  resolution  of  disagreement.
Although we may argue with other specific purposes in mind—for instance, to
influence, annoy, and impress people—, that disputing can fulfil these particular
ends in the way that it does may depend on our acceptance of  norms which entail
that the default purpose of  disputing is to resolve disagreement.
In this chapter I shall first characterise disagreement and disputes so as to
give us an idea of  the subject matter. I will then examine how one particularly
influential account of  disagreement interprets the relation between disagreeing
and disputing. After this I will put forward an account on which disagreement is
essential for understanding disputes, when it comes to disputes over matters of
fact, and defend it from some potential objections. In the last part, I will apply the
treatment to certain species of  disagreement in pro-attitude.
Disagreement and disputes: Some preliminaries
Before  we go on to look at  some accounts  of  disagreement,  which take  into
account its relation to disputing, and before we provide a positive account of  our
own,  we  must  clarify  our  target.  In  the  next  few  sections  I  will  distinguish
disagreements from disputes, I will examine the types of  mental states which can
be  involved  in  disagreement,  and  I  will  briefly  discuss  some  properties  of
disagreement which should feature in any account of  it.
Disagreements and disputes
9In  everyday  speech  we  often  use  the  terms  'disagreement'  and  'dispute'
synonymously, so drawing a distinction between them may seem rather pedantic;
in fact, I am sure the title of  this chapter will seem like nonsense to many. But
once we draw the distinction, the rationale will become clear.
Following a few other writers (Chalmers, 2011, Jenkins, 2014: 13), I will
use the term 'dispute' for conflicts where we explicitly engage in some kind of
argumentative  activity.  This  can  be  verbal  or  it  can  be  physical.  Two  people
arguing over whether Australia is bigger than Canada will count as disputing, as
will two people engaging in fisticuffs. It may be thought that the latter does not
constitute a dispute, but The Oxford English Dictionary is on my side here. A
physical fight is as much of  a dispute as a verbal argument, though perhaps of  a
different kind. At any rate, I could just say what I am concerned when I talk
about disputes is explicit conflict between multiple parties. Whether I am using the
word 'dispute' doesn't matter very much at all for this purpose. 
One paradigm form of  dispute is where one person says a sentence and in
reply another utters an apparently incompatible one. So one person could say “P”
and another could say “Not-P”.  Bear in mind that  I  am not saying that  it  is
necessary that the disputants assert contradictory propositions, as we see in the
next chapter, there are disputants who do not do so, specifically verbal disputants.
For a dispute it is enough that the parties appear to contradict one another. There
are other forms of  dispute, depending on what they are over; one person may say
“I want P” another may say “Well I won't allow you to have P”. Here, as in the
last case, the defining feature is that the disputants appear to be contradicting one
another; the difference is that they do not appear to be contradicting each other
with putative statements of  fact.  They are instead contradicting each other in
what states they wish to be realised. Of  course, disputes can be friendly. Two
people with different views may try and work together to a shared conclusion, but
in the course of  this, they will likely say things which seems to contradict what
the other says.
On the other hand, 'Disagreement'—as I am using the word—refers to a
relation that holds between agents as a result of  their respective mental states.
Essentially,  the  distinction  between  disputes  and  disagreements  then  is  that
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former is constituted by behaviour and the latter by the inner states of  the people
involved.  Two parties  need not be engaged in argument  in order for them to
disagree. Nor do two parties have to be in disagreement in order for them to be
having a dispute. 
Sometimes disputes and disagreements, as I have characterised them, are
conflated.  We  occasionally  speak  of  disagreement  as  an  activity;  it  is  not
uncommon to hear phrases like “Stop disagreeing with me!” or “Why is it that
you go along with what your friends say but you always disagree with me?” Now
some philosophers (Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009: 60-1)) have noted this and
also speak about a separate notion of  disagreement as an activity, so that when
one argues with another, they are in a sense disagreeing with them. I don't really
see how disagreeing in this sense differs in any significant way from disputing, so
I will just assume that such activities are disputes as I have characterised them. 
The vehicles of  disagreement
In the previous section, we have already stated that disagreement between two
people is constituted by their mental states, but there is the question of  which
kinds of  mental state are eligible for constituting disagreement. As Michael Ridge
points  out  (2013:  46),  it  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  any  two  states  having
incompatible contents. Two people could entertain contradictory hypotheses or
have contradictory fantasies and yet not disagree. The most obvious mental states
which we can disagree in are beliefs. 
Generally, if  one person believes P and another believes Not-P, then we
will be inclined to say they disagree. However, a few writers have taken it that
that we can disagree, not only in our beliefs, but also in our other mental states.
C.L. Stevenson, for example, distinguishes disagreement in belief  from disagreement
11
in  attitude1.  In  the  literature,  the  attitudes  that  Stevenson  has  in  mind  are
sometimes called 'pro-attitudes'; when I speak of  attitudes in this chapter, I will
speak of  attitudes broadly construed, that is, including beliefs, etc. unless I am
explicitly  speaking  about  disagreement  in  attitude,  by  which  I  mean,
disagreement in  pro-attitude. These pro-attitudes cover a fair few states of  mind.
They include hopes, desires, and preferences. It is hard to spell out exactly the
difference between desiring X and having a preference for X, but it seems to me
to be that the difference is more one of  degree than of  kind, so that a preference
would perhaps be a weak desire. We can add further detail to our characterisation
of  pro-attitudes with the notion of  direction of  fit. I take pro-attitudes to be those
attitudes with a world-to-mind—rather than a mind-to-world—direction of  fit.
The notion of  direction of  fit requires some explanation. Mark Platts says of  it:
Beliefs aim at the true, and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a
decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded; beliefs should be
changed  to  fit  the  world,  not  vice versa.  Desires  aim at  realisation,  and  their
realisation is the world fitting with them; the fact that the indicative content of  a
desire is not realised in the world is not a failing in the desire, and not yet any
reason to discard the desire; the world, crudely, should be changed to fit with our
desires, not vice versa. (1979: 256-7).
A way of  cashing out the precise difference between mental states with a world-
to-mind direction of  fit and those with a mind-to-world one, without using highly
metaphorical language, is Michael Smith's account. He distinguishes a desire that
P from a belief  that P by the different counterfactuals true of  them, regarding a
holder of  those attitudes perceiving that Not-P. If  Someone who believes that P
perceives that Not-P, then their belief  that P will generally go out of  existence.
Whereas, when someone with a desire that P perceives that Not-P, their desire
will  normally endure (1992: 113-6). Perhaps this is not the defining feature of
either beliefs or desires, but it shows that there are ways to distinguish between
them.
1 Of  course, accepting this distinction does not entail we must endorse Stevenson's particular
account of  either species of  disagreement. In fact, in this chapter I accept that we can disagree
in both beliefs and desires and then I go on to reject Stevenson's account of  the mechanism by
which we do. 
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That we can disagree in our full-blown desires is relatively uncontroversial.
It is a view held by Frank Jackson (1985), Simon Blackburn (1998), Philip Pettit
(1998),  Torfinn  Huvenes  (2012,  2014),  John  Hawthorne  (2014),  and  Michael
Ridge (2014). Stevenson's examples of  people disagreeing in their desires are also
quite intuitive:
John's mother is concerned about the dangers of  playing football, and doesn't
want him to play.  John,  even though he agrees (in  belief)  about  the dangers,
wants to play anyhow. Again, they disagree. (1944: 3)
I  personally  find  this  quite  compelling  and  would  naturally  it  call  a  case  of
disagreement. 
However,  it  is  slightly  more  controversial  that  we  can  disagree  in  our
preferences.  Although  some  writers  do  hold  this  view  (Weatherson  (2009),
Huvenes  (2012,  2014))  it  seems  to  some  (including  me)  to  be  right  on  the
boundary between disagreement and mere difference in mental state. I will not
pursue the question of  whether we can disagree in our preferences, or indeed,
whether there can be cases of  'Faultless disagreement' in this chapter. For now we
should  agree  on  the  non-controversial  idea  that  we  can  disagree  in  both  our
beliefs and our desires.
Some features of  disagreement
In the last few sections we have already noted a few features of  disagreement. For
instance, that it is constituted by the mental states of  the relevant parties rather
than their behaviour, that it is constituted at least partly by the parties holding
contrary attitudes, and that there are multiple types of  mental state—e.g. beliefs,
desires—of  which tokens can constitute disagreement. There is one more feature
of  disagreement which we should mention, before going on to look at an actual
account of  disagreement and trying to explicate its connection to the notion of
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disputing. 
This  feature  of  disagreement  is  its  logical  form.  As John MacFarlane2
points out
x is in disagreement with y
is not specific enough for an adequate account (2014: 120). For a start, X and Y
need  to  be  in  disagreement  over  something;  they  won't  be  in  disagreement
simpliciter, whatever that might be. MacFarlane also holds that some kinds of
disagreement lack propositional content, so it wouldn't be enough to say that two
people disagree over a particular proposition P. One way to capture this is by
holding that the relation is somehow disagreement with -ing; this -ing couldΦ Φ
be holding a particular belief  or pro-attitude. Some disagreement, according to
MacFarlane, also can depend not only “on the contents of  the relevant attitudes,
but  on  the  contexts  in  which  they  occur”  (ibid).  A  case  of  people  holding
attitudes with conflicting contents which do not constitute disagreement could be
where Ambra at 3pm believes Jane is sitting, and Alessandro at 5pm believes Jane
is not sitting. A case where we have disagreement but no conflicting contents could
be where Ambra believes Jane is in the hairdressers when she is in St Andrews high
street, and where Alessandro believes Jane is in the hairdressers when he is walking
in Bologna. Disagreement is not merely a relation between multiple people; the
logical  form  of  disagreement  is  that  of  a  “relation  between  a  person  and  a
possible speech act or attitude in context” (ibid). MacFarlane concludes that the
logical form of  disagreement is this:
x is in disagreement with Φ-ing-in-context-c 
-ing in this sense could be either performing a particular action, or it could beΦ
holding  a  particular  belief.  Despite  this,  I  will  mostly  talk  about  two  people
disagreeing with each other, rather than each other's attitudes. I don't think we
2 In this section I use some controversial examples, specifically the ones which depend on thesis 
that Ambra and Alessandro could believe the same proposition (Jane is in the hairdressers) 
despite their different contexts. A contextualist, for example, could say that both believe 
different propositions, i.e. Jane is in the hairdressers in St Andrews and Jane is in the hairdressers in 
Bologna. I do not commit to any particular thesis on this subject; I use the example merely to 
illustrate how context is important to disagreement.
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lose  anything  by  speaking  this  way  in  most  cases.  However,  we  need  to
understand that disagreement is essentially a relation between agents and certain
attitudes when we go on to talk about how part of  disagreement is disapproving
of  the holding of  that attitude. The relevance of  this will become clear later, but
for  now it  will  suffice  to  say  that  'disagreeing  with  Φ-ing-in-context-c',  better
represents the way we are inclined to disapprove of  the attitudes we do disagree
with, than does the simple 'x is in disagreement with y' structure. 
 
Stevenson's account of  disagreement
To really illustrate the question I wish to answer in this chapter, it will be useful to
look at an account of  disagreement which provides an answer (or rather, a sketch
of  one) to it. C.L. Stevenson provides such an account. Before I investigate how
he  links  disagreement  and  disputing,  I  will  outline  his  account.  Stevenson
attempts to capture both disagreement in belief  and in attitude. Here are a few
quotes of  his which detail his theory:
'disagreement in belief' . . . occurs when Mr. A believes P, when Mr. B believes
not-P, or something incompatible with P, and when neither is content to let the
belief  of  the other remain unchallenged. (1963: 1) 
[Disagreement  in  attitude]  occurs  when  Mr.  A  has  a  favorable  attitude  to
something, when Mr. B has an unfavorable attitude to it,  and when neither is
content to let the other's attitude remain unchanged (1963: 1)
The difference between these two senses of  'disagreement' is essentially this: the
first  involves an opposition of  beliefs,  both of  which cannot be true, and the
second involves an opposition of  attitudes,  both of  which cannot  be satisfied
(1963: 2).
Stevenson's  overall  account of  disagreement has two main components:  First,
incompatibility of  the relevant attitudes (broadly construed to include beliefs).
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Second, both parties wanting to change each other's attitudes. 
His account distinguishes between disagreement in attitude and belief  in a
few ways: First, disagreement in attitude requires that one of  the relevant parties
has a favourable attitude to the thing they are disagreeing over whilst the other
has an unfavourable attitude to it; so one party may have a desire for something
and another would have a desire against that. This would not be the case with
disagreement in belief; a belief  should not be construed as a favourable attitude to
something in the same way. A second related difference is the way the two types
of  disagreement feature incompatibility. Disagreement in belief  features beliefs
which  cannot  both  be  true,  whilst  disagreement  in  attitude  features  attitudes
which  cannot  both  be  satisfied.  The  difference  here  is  in  the  mental  state's
direction of  fit; the respective type of  mental state's teleology.
Stevenson on disagreement and disputes
Recall that earlier on in the chapter (in the section entitled “Disagreements and
disputes”) we noted the importance of  separating disagreements and disputes so
that we do not conflate them. But in another sense, it is important to link them,
which  is  the  subject  of  this  chapter.  The  former  sense  is  that  disputing  and
disagreeing  are  different  notions,  disputing  being  overtly  behavioural  and
disagreeing  being primarily  a  relation between mental  states.  The latter  sense
concerns the degree to which the notions themselves are related; saying that there
are norms entailing that disputing is only justified when there is disagreement
present would be linking the notions in this sense.
Stevenson's account is primarily of  interest to us because of  the way his
account links disputing with disagreeing. The way he does this is summed up by
two clauses contained respectively within the first and second quotes. The first is
that when two people disagree in belief  they are not content to allow each other's
beliefs  to  go  unchallenged,  the  second  is  that  when  two  people  disagree  in
attitude they are not content to let each other's desires remain unchanged. These
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both  have the  implication  that  when they  disagree,  the  parties  will  view one
another as having the wrong attitudes and being in need of  correction; at the very
least, the parties would view each other's attitudes as worthy of  being called into
question.  This  is  where  disputing  comes  in;  the  natural  way  of  changing  or
challenging another person's attitudes is to argue with them. With this method we
can criticise the position of  the person with whom we disagree; if  they believe
that P, and we do not, we could present evidence against P holding to change
their mind. This is most apparent in cases of  disputes over seeming matters of
fact. One person says “P”, another person believes that Not-P and because they
take the first person to be incorrect they challenge them by  saying something to
the effect of  “Not-P”. This is  the way Stevenson links up disagreements with
disputes; Disagreement brings with it a prima facie desire to dispute with whoever
we disagree with.
It  might  be  thought  that  Stevenson  is  just  conflating  disagreeing  and
disputing; so that in order to disagree with someone, we have to also dispute with
them. This would be false however. Notice that according to the first two quotes,
one does not need explicit conflict in order to disagree with another; rather, one
needs a motive for arguing with them—e.g. To change or challenge the attitude
they hold, because they are discontented with them holding it. In this way, his
account is perfectly consistent with the notions of  disagreement and dispute being
distinct.  One  can  satisfy  Stevenson's  conditions  for  disagreement  without
exhibiting  argumentative  behaviour.  In  this  way,  not  only  does  Stevenson's
account  allow the  notions  of  disagreement  and dispute  to  be  distinct,  it  also
shows how they are related.
However, disagreement, as I have said, is a relation that can hold between
two people regardless of  familiarity or spatio-temporal location. Recognising that
someone holds a particular attitude and wanting to change or challenge it is not
necessary for disagreeing with them. If  it was, then it would be wrong to say a
perfectly respectable sentence like “I disagree with Mussolini on a great many
things, but...” or “I disagree with anyone who believes in ghosts!” The fact that
these sentences don't strike us as infelicitous, and that we often do use the notion
of  disagreement in this way is good evidence for the claim that disagreement does
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not require familiarity. What Stevenson's account gets wrong is it entails that in
order to disagree with someone we need to be uncomfortable with that person
actually holding those attitudes  we disagree with. Recall  John MacFarlane's view
that disagreement is a “relation between a person and a possible speech act or
attitude in context” (2014: 120). This entails that we can disagree, not only with
people we are unfamiliar with, but also with certain attitudes. For example, we
can make statements such as “I completely disagree with the view that Tony Blair
is secretly from Kazakhstan” and not be saying nonsense. In this way, if  someone
holds a particular attitude in a certain context, then we can disagree with them
without  knowing  they  hold  it.  Hence  dissatisfaction  with  letting  a  particular
person's attitudes remain unchallenged or unchanged should not be a necessary
condition for disagreement. 
Stevenson's conditions get something important right though. Generally,
disagreement  is  uncomfortable;  it  implies  that  someone  is  at  fault.  This  is
especially apparent when two people disagree in belief. In many such cases, at
least one person will be not merely false, but also wrong. To jump ahead slightly,
the presence of  disagreement brings with it an incentive for it to be resolved. This
could be  the  reason for  us  generally  viewing disagreement  as  a  matter  to  be
resolved, preferably in favour of  our own point of  view. But as we have seen,
what  Stevenson's  condition  gets  wrong  is  that  the  relevant  disapproval  is  not
limited  to  cases  where  the  parties  believe  of  each  other  that  they  hold
incompatible attitudes. An agent can disagree with someone without being at all
familiar with them; they can even disagree with attitudes that no one holds. To go
back to MacFarlane, this is because disagreement is a relation between an agent
and  a  possible  attitude  or  speech  act.  When  we  disagree  with  someone,  we
disagree with the attitude they hold. 
Part of  disagreeing with an attitude would be disapproving of  someone
holding it. This is why we accept a slightly weaker claim that when two people
know they  disagree  they  will  not  be  content  to  let  each  other's  attitudes  go
unchallenged; each person would disapprove of  the relevant attitude the other
holds. However, Stevenson is wrong in holding the stronger position that in order
to disagree, two people must want to actually change the other's attitudes. The
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truth of  the weaker claim could just be the consequence of  agents disapproving
of  the holding of  attitudes when they disagree with them, and hence viewing
others holding these attitudes as being in need of  correction. In this sense, us not
being content to let people remain unchallenged when we know we disagree with
them, could be a case of  a more general phenomenon. 
So what Stevenson gets right is that the we are not content to live and let
live when we know we disagree with someone. What he gets wrong however, is
that disagreement stretches further than those cases where we actually want to
change someone's attitude. In the next few sections I will attempt to provide a
different and more detailed account, which is consistent with disagreement being
able to hold between agents who are unfamiliar with each other.
Grounding disputes
Now I wish to examine the connection between disputes and disagreement in
more  detail.  As  stated  in  the  introduction,  I  believe  the  connection  between
disagreements and disputes is justificatory in nature, so that (roughly) a dispute is
justified when it arises from the appropriate type of  disagreement, and unjustified
when it does not. At the very least, our practice of  disputing suggests strongly
that we view disputes not standing in the appropriate relation to disagreement as
unjustified. For instance, take this verbal dispute: A British person—referring to a
crane  fly—could  say  to  an  American  “There  was  a  daddy-long-legs  in  the
kitchen, but it flew out of  the window”, and the American—believing that the
Briton is  referring  to a  harvestman—may reply “No it  didn't,  daddy-long-legs
can't fly!” We would not view this dispute as justified, as it arises from them using
'daddy-long-legs' in different ways, rather than disagreement over whether a crane
fly (or a harvestman) flew out of  the kitchen window. One may characterise the
Briton and American as having metalinguistic disagreement, that is, conflicting
beliefs  about  what  the  phrase  'daddy-long-legs'  refers  to.  However  this
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disagreement would not be of  the appropriate type to justify the dispute. 
The appropriate type of  disagreement I take to be disagreement which is
relevant to the subject matter of  the dispute. The Briton and the American may
have metalinguistic disagreement over what 'daddy-long-legs' refers to, and this
disagreement  could  surely  ground  a  dispute  over  this  subject;  however,  their
dispute is a first order one about whether a certain type of  animal can fly, and
would have to arise from disagreement over this matter in order to be justified. As
it happens, it doesn't arise from this source—rather it comes from their linguistic
differences, which would give rise to the dispute whether or not the disputants
believed all  the  same things  about  the  respective  biologies  of  crane  flies  and
harvestmen.
This justificatory relation I envision is slightly different from that proposed
by Stevenson's account; the latter implying that we are motivated to dispute when
we  disagree,  but  does  not  say  much  more  on  the  subject  than  that.  The
justificatory account says instead that two people have a (at least prima facie)
reason to dispute when they disagree, and that they have no reason to if  they
don't; if  two people do not disagree, then they should not dispute. The difference
between the the justificatory relation and Stevenson's  is  that  in order to meet
Stevenson's condition (that we are motivated to change the attitudes of  the person
we disagree with) one must be familiar with the person one disagrees with, so
that one knows that together they hold jointly contrary attitudes; whereas one can
have justification to dispute with another regardless  of  knowledge of  them or
their mental states. The justificatory condition I envisage, in contrast, could hold
regardless of  one's knowledge of  the mental state of  who they disagree with. For
example, if  I disagree with someone whom I am not familiar with over whether
David Cameron will win the next election, I have a reason to dispute with them.
Of course, there may be other overriding reasons for me not to dispute with them,
e.g. that I do not know that they disagree with me, that we are in a no-talking
zone, that we don't actually know each other, etc., but these do not mean there is
no prima facie justification for arguing, which can be overridden by others. 
My explanation of  this apparent justificatory relation, is that there is a
certain default purpose that disputing (at least conventionally) serves for us, and
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the extent to which we view the existence of  a given dispute as justified is tied to
the way in which the dispute is suited to serving this purpose. This purpose of
disputing, I argue, is to resolve disagreement.  It  is for this reason that we see
disputes  which  do  not  arise  from  appropriate  disagreement  as  prima  facie
unjustified, and disagreements that do as prima facie justified. What I mean by
'default purpose' here does not entail a metaphysical thesis about the the actual
and possible structure of  disputes. My point is just that there is a conventional
understanding that if  two people are sincerely disputing, then generally they will
be working towards agreement. As I shall show, there are cases where disputes
may not be aimed at this goal, but most—if  not all—will feature insincerity on
the part of  the person with this other goal in mind; one disputant will try to give
the impression that there is disagreement that they are trying to resolve. Although
we can—and do—dispute for other purposes, resolving disagreement is viewed by
us as the primary purpose of  disputing, and perhaps other possible purposes it
may serve are derivative of  this. We behave as if  there is a certain norm governing
our argumentative practices. Resolution I think captures this:
Resolution: The default purpose of  disputing is taken to be the resolution of
disagreement.
Now in supporting the claim that our disputing behaviour is in accordance with
Resolution, I will restrict my attention to disputes over apparent matters of  fact;
those  seemingly  grounded  by  conflicting  beliefs.  That  we  have  genuine
disagreements  in  the  vicinity  is  uncontroversial  (unlike  when  talking  about
'disagreement in preference'). I will wait until later to apply the treatment to other
types of  dispute and disagreement. I shall first explain Resolution and show how
we do behave as if  we are governed by such a norm. Later on, I will show how
this can support the idea that the relation between disagreeing and disputing is a
justificatory one.
I will occasionally slip between talking about us seeing disputes as justified
and them being justified. This is mainly for sake of  ease. When I do say that a
dispute is justified, I mean that it is of  the type we are liable to see as justified.
One may object that, in that case, all I am showing in this chapter is not anything
interesting about disputes, but rather just some observations about our disputing
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behaviour. The interesting question, they may add, regards how to tell whether a
dispute really is justified. I however, think there are good reasons to be interested
in the way our folk-notions of  disputing and disagreeing interplay. As I state in
the  next  sections,  there  are  good  reasons  for  resolving  disagreement,  and
disputing is the best way for us to do this. The way we see disputes as justified,
may heavily imply that they are justified, as the conventional purpose they hold
for us clearly at least has some pragmatic virtue. 
The default purpose of  disputing
So what support do we have for the claim that the default purpose of  disputing is
to resolve disagreement? Well let's first start from the uncontroversial point that
we frequently do argue with this purpose in mind. When two parties argue about
a matter of  fact, such as whether or not King Arthur was a living person, it is a
pretty safe bet that they are trying to bring the other person around to their point
of  view, and hence establish agreement on it.  But even if  the parties  are not
consciously trying to establish it, agreement can still be the product of  reasoned
argument; also resolving disagreement in this way has many benefits. Huw Price
produces  some  valuable  insights  into  the  relation  between  disputes  and
disagreement  in  Facts  and the  Function of  Truth.  Price argues that  disputes are
behaviourally advantageous because they allow us to assess a range of  options of
how  to  act,  or  rather  assess  beliefs  with  different  behavioural  consequences.
When we are in a community we have access to a greater body of  experience
than we would if  solitary. It can be useful for us to have our beliefs tested when
we have access to the community's experience; a better informed person can tell
us  that  the  attitudes  we  hold  may  lead  us  to  perform  actions  with  bad
consequences, e.g. injury or death.  A dispute consisting of  reasoned argument
seems to be the natural  way to decide who is correct  in situations where our
attitudes seemingly conflict, as ceteris paribus the person who is correct (or perhaps
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just better informed) will produce the more convincing case. Price says:
In the long run, I suggested, such disputes can be expected to have a beneficial
effect on the behavioural dispositions of  individual speakers. They help us ensure
that as individuals we hold and act on attitudes that reflect, to some extent, the
combined wisdom of  our linguistic community. Our behavioural dispositions can
thus be tested against those of  other speakers, before they are put to use in the
world. The guiding principle is that it is better to be criticised for claiming that
tigers are harmless than to discover one's mistake in the flesh (1988: 145).
We can see from this quote that Price holds that certain disputes have a practical
basis, in that they encourage good behaviour and discourage bad behaviour. In a
dispute we would investigate which disputant has the more robust view by seeing
which stands up to the most scrutiny. Agreement would be established by one
disputant relinquishing their view and adopting the better one. Agreement is not
good for its own sake, for we can agree on falsities; it would not do very well for
the disputants to argue over whether Tigers are harmless and then conclude that
they indeed are.  In disputing we should want to establish  good behaviour  all
round, and hence we would want to establish agreement on what is correct to
believe. 
Resolving disagreement  via  disputing  can have this  result  because in a
speech  community,  “utterances  of  a  given  sentence  tend  to  be  correlated  to
mental  states  with  similar  causal  or  functional  roles  in  the  determination  of
behaviour” (1988: 152). Price calls the Same Boat Property the one which is shared
by  classes  of  mental  states  whose  “behavioural  appropriateness,  or  utility,  is
predominantly similar  across a speech community.  If  a mental  state  has  [this
property], then if  it is appropriate for any one of  us, it is appropriate for all of  us”
(ibid). Presumably the beliefs we agree on in certain disputes have this property,
which is a reason for wanting agreement; it would establish good behaviour all
round. Furthermore, this would mean that when two people are disputing—as it
is likely they really do disagree—they would be in different mental states and so
one would likely be behaviourally disadvantaged “If  a mental state has the SBP,
then if  it is appropriate for any one of  us, it is appropriate for all – we are all in
the same boat” (ibid). 
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One explanation for this is that the useful beliefs—the ones which dispose
us  towards  good  behaviour—are  generally  true,  or  have  some  truth-seeking
property. Good behaviour will then be that which arises from having true beliefs;
the ones which will help us in our goals, e.g. surviving and succeeding. This could
also be thought to be what underlies the same boat property: “it may seem that
the required case of  the SBP is a trivial consequence of  the truth-conditional view
of  belief; that beliefs with the same truth condition are clearly appropriate in the
same circumstances – namely, when and only when their truth conditions obtain”
(ibid).  So in aiming at establishing good behaviour all  round, disputes aim at
everyone getting to the truth of  the matter; it cannot do that unless it resolves the
disagreement. Now for our purposes we could perhaps go in for this idea, but
Price  would  view  this  explanation  as  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse.  His
explanation of  truth is  centred around its  function in  rational  argument,  and
furthermore, is a reaction to what he sees as a failure to provide an analysis of
truth. For now, I will not explain the usefulness of  disputes in terms of  truth,
mainly because I don't think it is necessary once we accept that the appropriate
behaviour will  be the kind which arises from beliefs which are more likely to
stand up to scrutiny than those which produce inappropriate behaviour.
Our motivation to establish agreement on the attitudes which will give rise
to good behaviour, Price says, comes from our acceptance of  what he calls  The
Truth Norm:
Truth: If  Not-P, then it is incorrect to assert that P; if  Not P, there are prima
facie grounds for censure of  an assertion that P. (2003: 170).
This norm entails that if  we believe that Not-P and we hear someone assert that
P,  then we take it  that  that  person is  at  fault,  and hence,  we are  disposed to
disapprove  of  them  believing  Not-P.  This,  Price  states,  gives  us  “preferential
pressure towards settling the  disagreement in question” (2003: 175). This norm,
he says: 
makes  what  would  otherwise  be  no-fault  disagreements  into  unstable  social
situations,  whose  instability  is  resolved  only  by  argument  and  consequent
agreement—and it provides an immediate incentive for argument, in that it holds
out to the successful arguer the reward consisting in her community's positive
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evaluation of  her dialectical position. (ibid).
Of  course, being rewarded by one's community is not the only motivation for
settling  disagreement.  Our  disapproval  itself  will  make  us  want  to  explicitly
dissent from opinions we do not agree with; in general, disagreement just does
not sit comfortably with us. 
Now I think that Price is right, when it comes to the utility of  disputes I
have restricted the treatment to for now—that is, those over apparent matters of
fact.  But these remarks by themselves only establish that disputing is a useful
exercise as it can resolve uncomfortable social situations and encourage useful
behaviour. In order to show that the default purpose of  disputing is to resolve
disagreement  we  need  further  argument.  Here  are  two  points  that  I  believe
support this conclusion: Firstly, when two disputants find out that they do not
disagree, they will most likely finish arguing about whatever it was they thought
they disagreed over—if  they really want to argue for whatever reason, they may
shift the focus of  the dispute rather than finish arguing altogether. We can see this
in  further  examples  of  verbal  disputes  (the  subject  of  the  next  chapter).  For
instance, if  a British person says to their American partner that they “need new
pants” when they have very little underwear in their wardrobe but an abundance
of  trousers, the latter may dispute what the former says by replying “But you have
tons of  pants”. However, when both are shown that they each use the term 'pants'
in a different manner and that they agree on the respective numbers of  underwear
and  trousers  in  the  wardrobe,  they  would  generally  cease  arguing  about  the
subject at hand. They may carry on arguing, but about a different subject; they
may follow up their original dispute with one about what the word 'pants' denotes
in the linguistic community they inhabit, or even about whether the number of
underwear  in  the  wardrobe  is  sufficient.  This  does  not  entail  that  we  always
dispute to resolve disagreement, but it does suggest that we accept certain norms
about when to dispute. For instance, one such norm—which we have previously
alluded to when talking about the justificatory nature of  the relation between
disagreeing and disputing—is this:
Disagreement1: Two parties should (prima facie) not dispute with another if
they do not disagree over the subject matter of  the dispute. 
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The  best  explanation  of  such  norms  would  be  us  accepting  something  like
Resolution. It is all very well  Truth leaving room for resolving disagreement and
for  motivating  it,  but  we would need  another  norm to  place  the  presence  of
disagreement  as  a  restriction  on  disputing.  Now,  there  is  a  variation  of
Disagreement we would not accept, i.e. that if  the two parties do disagree then they
should dispute. As I stated earlier, there may be other overriding reasons not to
dispute. What we would accept, is this:
Disagreement2: If  two parties disagree, then they have a reason to dispute
with one another.
So if  two people disagree, then we have the grounds for a dispute.  Truth pretty
much gives us this result: if  two people genuinely disagree (recall, for the moment
we are speaking only about disagreement over apparent matters of  fact; I intend
to exclude disagreement in attitude, and faultless disagreement) then one of  them
will be incorrect, and so there will be “prima facie grounds for a censure” of  the
incorrect view (2003: 170); we will want to resolve the disagreement in favour of
the correct view.
The second point  I  will  make can be seen as an answer to a potential
objection as well as a positive argument for my position. The objection would go
something like this:
You say that the default purpose of  disputing is to resolve disagreement. Well
there are plenty of  ways we can dispute with a different purpose in mind. I may
argue with someone because it will annoy them, to impress an onlooker, to put
them in their place. There are situations where I may play devil's advocate, or
argue with someone who I know will never agree with me. How then can we say
that resolving disagreement is the default purpose of  disputing?
My answer to this potential objection is that although particular disputes may not
themselves  be  specifically  aimed  at  resolving  disagreement,  they  fulfil  their
intended  purposes  because  of  our  mutual  understanding  that  the  purpose  of
disputes is to resolve disagreement in favour of  the correct view. For instance, one
of  the reasons disputing with someone (under certain circumstances) may annoy
them is  because  it  heavily  implies  that  we  take  them to  believe  or  be  saying
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something false; falsity is a defect when it comes to assertions and beliefs, and
they may be annoyed that we would have the audacity to question their beliefs, or
that they may be wrong. 
By  the  same  token,  we  could  impress  an  onlooker  by  arguing  with
someone  else  because  in  doing  so  (and  doing  so  well)  we  could  give  the
impression that we are right and our fellow disputant is wrong. This would give
suggest that we are in a better epistemic position then our opponent. We could
put someone in their place by disputing with them because in doing so we may
give the impression that our beliefs are correct whilst theirs are false (again, if  we
argue well). The intended effect would be maximised in these cases if  we won the
argument, and hence established agreement in favour of  our view. 
So in some cases, the conventional purpose of  disputing being to resolve
disagreement  is  compatible  with  us  occasionally  disputing  with  a  different
purpose in mind. Furthermore, as we see in the previous few paragraphs to some
extent disputing to achieve these purposes may rely on this mutual understanding
of  the purpose of  disputing. It  is for these reasons I  do not think pointing to
particular intended effects of  a dispute is a good strategy to challenge Resolution.
The problem with this  strategy is  that  Resolution does  not  entail  that  we  only
dispute with the intended purpose of  resolving disagreement; it is rather a claim
about what we conventionally recognise the purpose of  disputing to be. 
A better strategy would be to produce a convincing case where someone
argues in a way which relies on the conventional understanding of  the purpose of
disputes being something other than establishing agreement. To me it does not
seem likely that disputes over matters of  fact could conventionally be used for any
purpose significantly far away from this. There is something about the structure
of  disputes over factual matters, which makes it fit for resolving disagreement in
favour of  the correct view. I believe P, you believe Not-P; I produce evidence for
P, you do the same for Not-P.  The presentation of  our respective positions, our
attempts to justify them, and criticism of  the other's view, makes it seem very
much like we are  trying to  increase  credence in our  position and lower it  in
others. If  this credence lowering and raising is carried out to a certain point, then
the disagreement  is  resolved.  Generally,  but  not  always,  better  arguments  and
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more justified positions will be more compelling than the weaker arguments and
the less justified positions. So we can see how this process of  disputing can lead
to agreement on the best position, and how it seems like a rathet good way of
getting to this point. 
Even  if  we  did  generally  use  disputes  over  matters  of  fact  to  gain
influence, win favour, etc., could we understand disputes to be for this purpose?
Such a situation would beg the question of  why others would place value on
success in a dispute at all. We have a clear rationale for it if  Resolution is correct,
as we would understand success in disputes to be generally indicative of  correct
beliefs. But if  we viewed the purpose of  disputing as simply gaining favour, then
we would need to ask what we would be winning the favour for.
In the case of  playing devil's advocate. In doing so, we would assume that
if  one position (the devil's  position)  were correct,  then the other  (the  angel's)
would be false.  One would make as if  there is disagreement between the two
disputants  and  see  where  the  argument  between  them  would  go.  One  must
remember that playing devils advocate is not an end in itself, rather it is itself  a
conversational tool. So in order to see how it can rely on a recognition of  what
the  default  purpose  of  disputing  is,  one must  see  what  we try  to  achieve  by
playing devils advocate. Now one might—just as in the first case we looked at—
be trying to agitate someone by denying what they say, but we have seen already
how cases like this fit into my account. What other value does it have? Well it
means that in a room full of  people who agree on P, we can still get the benefits
of  argument, e.g. it can force us to justify our own opinions and it can help us
consider other points of  view. It is a way of  simulating a dispute grounded in real
disagreement, so that we can get some of  the benefits that argumentation brings.
In cases like this, we would still get the best result from establishing agreement on
the better point of  view; part of  the benefit of  simulating disagreement, is that
you act as if  there is some present, and you aim to resolve it. It is in this way that
playing Devil's advocate relies on the default purpose of  disputing to be resolving
disagreement. Playing out an argument between the two viewpoints, as if  it was a
genuine dispute, gets us the most from the exercise. 
The same goes  for  disputing  with  someone  who will  not  change  their
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mind. We must ask for the reason one has in arguing with someone so set in their
own views. True, if  we know that someone wouldn't change their mind even if
we did argue with them, then it would be irrational to attempt to bring them
around to our view. But it is not incompatible with Resolution to attempt to do so,
especially so when we are inclined to disapprove of  those who we disagree with;
someone may still argue with another who they know won't change their mind,
because they view attempting to correct someone as the right thing to do, even if
they  are  unsuccessful  at  it.  In  order  to  show  such  a  situation  to  be  a
counterexample to our treatment of  disputing, our interlocutor would have to
provide a plausible purpose for doing so which was incompatible with Resolution.
For the reasons given in this section, I am doubtful that one can be found.
Consequences of  this
There are some novel, but I think intuitive, consequences of  Resolution, some we
have already mentioned: (1) It gives rise to certain derivative norms governing our
practices of  disputing. For instance, it strongly suggests the general acceptance of
norms like  Disagreement, which entail that in order to be prima facie justified, a
dispute  must  be  grounded  in  disagreement.  But  Resolution  I  think  suggests  a
stronger conclusion than this. It suggests my earlier assertion (2) that not just any
old disagreement can justify a dispute. Our disagreement over whether the poem
The Battle  of  Maldon is  a  reliable historical  source,  would in no way justify a
dispute over whether the X60 or the 95 bus is the faster way to travel from St
Andrews to  Leven.  However,  it  may justify  a  dispute  over  whether  the  battle
really  took place next  to  the  Blackwater  river.  This  is  obvious,  but  there  is  a
reason for this which draws from Resolution; the dispute over the buses could not,
or should not, help resolve any disagreement over the battle of  Maldon. This is
because of  the two subjects' irrelevance to one another.
So the disagreement must be relevant to the dispute. I would go further, and
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say that the disagreement must somehow explain the dispute. It wouldn't do very
well for there to be a dispute between two people where they disagree over the
relevant matters but where the disagreement in no way causes or contributes to
the dispute; the dispute must arise, or at least progress, in virtue of  the underlying
disagreement. Observe David Chalmers's definition of  a verbal dispute:
A dispute over S is broadly verbal when, for some expression T in S, the parties
disagree about the meaning of  T, and the dispute over S arises wholly in virtue of
this disagreement regarding T (2011: 522).
He clarifies the in-virtue-of  characterisation by saying it  “should be understood
as an  explanatory 'in virtue of': the idea is that the metalinguistic disagreement
explains  the  apparent  first-order  disagreement.  And  the  relevant  sort  of
explanation  should  require  something  stronger  than  an  arbitrary  causal  or
evidential explanation” (2011: 523). Just as a verbal dispute would arise in virtue
of  metalinguistic disagreement3,  a justified dispute would be explained by the
disagreement between the disputants. 
Disagreement in attitude
In this section I will show how it is possible to extend my account to certain cases
of  disagreement in pro-attitudes. Thus far I have explicitly restricted my account
to disputes and disagreements over apparent matters of  fact. However, as we see
from  early  on  in  this  chapter,  this  is  not  comprehensive  of  disagreement  in
general.  In  a  dispute  over  matters  of  fact  we  call  into  question  the  other
disputant's beliefs; accordingly disagreements which ground such disputes will be
cases of  disagreement in belief.  But as we have seen from Stevenson, we can
disagree in attitude—or rather, pro-attitude—as well.  As our account stands,  we
haven't  answered  the  question  of  how  disagreement  in  attitude  can  ground
3 Something I call into question in the second chapter.
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disputes. Some norms such as Truth that I mention in the previous sections do not
seem  to  have  much  crossover  at  all  to  disagreements  between  attitudes  like
desires; desires just aren't the kind of  things that are capable of  being true or false.
Saying  this,  I  think  our  account  can  encompass  other  types  of
disagreement with some tweaking. The main thrust of  the last few sections was
that the link between disagreeing and disputing is a justificatory one. We can still
get that same result in cases of  disagreement in attitude, although what makes
disagreements in attitude justify certain disputes will differ from disagreement in
belief.  Just  as  in  the  cases  of  disagreement  in  belief,  when  disagreement  in
attitude—or rather, the cases I will limit myself  to—underlies a dispute, it should
be appropriate for the purpose of  grounding that particular dispute; it should be
relevant and should  explain the dispute.  The way the justificatory relation holds
between certain cases of  disagreement in attitude would reflect the purpose—or
conventional purpose—of  the disputes that they ground; this purpose however,
will perhaps differ from those grounded by disagreements in belief. 
These  points  form  the  core  of  my  explanation  of  the  link  between
disagreeing and disputing. The justificatory account, I shall show, can be applied
to at least some disagreements in pro-attitudes. For some types of  disagreement
in attitude, the disagreement can justify certain types of  disputes, and those types
of  disputes  should  not  be  undertaken  if  not  grounded  by  the  right  kind  of
disagreement in attitude.  The brief  treatment I  will  give in this section is not
meant to cover  all disagreements in attitude. Rather, its purpose is to show that
something  like  the  treatment  of  disagreements  and  disputes  over  apparently
factual matters that I gave in the previous sections can, in principle, be extended
to other types of  disagreement and disputes. Our treatment of  disagreement in
attitude  will  be  slightly  different  from  the  former,  but  not  in  a  way  that
jeopardises the broad overall account. 
Let's consider an example of  disagreement in attitude from Stevenson:
John's mother is concerned about the dangers of  playing football, and doesn't
want him to play.  John,  even though he agrees (in  belief)  about  the dangers,
wants to play anyhow. (1944: 2)
Now, a dispute could very easily arise in virtue of  this case of  disagreement in
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attitude, but this dispute would differ in a number of  ways from a dispute over
matters of  fact. Firstly, it would differ in the way the dispute could be won. In a
dispute over matters of  fact, one party wins the dispute when they bring the other
around to their view; it requires a change in belief  on behalf  of  one disputant.
However, in the football  case, the dispute can be seemingly be won without a
change in the relevant attitude. Perhaps John's mother, while not changing John's
attitude about playing football,  still  manages to persuade him not to play. She
could change his beliefs regarding how much it would upset her if  he injured
himself, or she could even attempt to increase the potency of  his desire to not
upset her without changing his beliefs. The aim of  both of  these options here
would  be  to  override  John's  desire  to  play  football  with  another  desire,  in
particular, to not upset his mother.
It is clear to see that there is a similar justificatory link here, as in the cases
discussed in the last few sections. If  John and his Mother did not disagree in
attitude, but for some reason still engaged in the same dispute (perhaps with John
lying about wanting to play football  to annoy his  mother),  then we would be
inclined to view this dispute as ungrounded. So, at a first glance, it may seem as if
our  practice  of  disputing  in  cases  like  this,  is  governed  by  a  norm  such  as
Resolution. So that we see the John and his mother's  original dispute as justified
because  of  their  dispute  being  appropriate  for  the  purpose  of  resolving
disagreement in attitude; in the cases where they do not disagree in attitude, we
would not see the dispute as justified because of  there being no disagreement to
resolve.
The first dispute (where John and his mother disagree in attitude) seems
justified because of  the presence of  disagreement, and the second (where John
and his mother do not disagree in attitude) seems unjustified because of  the lack
of  it. However, this may not entail that these kinds of  disputes are geared towards
resolving disagreement. Sure, if  agreement is established in favour of  one view
then one party  has  been successful.  But  this  may not  be  the  only  way to  be
successful in a dispute. Consider success in the kinds of  disputes we looked at in
the previous sections, those grounded by disagreements in belief. Our beliefs are
supposed to capture how the world actually is because they have a mind-to-world
32
direction of  fit. In this way, when two parties are arguing over what is the case,
they are working out which beliefs fit the world (or perhaps which ones are the
most useful for navigating it) and therefore, which ones to have. Success in an
argument is it ending in favour of  what one takes to be the correct beliefs.
But  the  case  of  John  and  his  mother  is  different  diverges  from  this
template because their dispute is grounded by incompatible desires rather than
beliefs.  Now,  success  in  a  dispute  about  apparent  matters  of  facts  requires
changing one's opponent's beliefs; the dispute is about whose beliefs fit the world,
and  hence  whose  beliefs  are  correct.  However,  desires  have  a  world-to-mind
direction of  fit, rather than a mind-to-world direction of  fit like beliefs. The way
in which desires are incompatible—at least in the case we are looking at—is that
they cannot be jointly satisfied4, whereas beliefs are incompatible when they both
cannot be true. Another way of  putting this is that two beliefs are compatible
when they both cannot fit the world, but two desires are incompatible when the
world cannot fit both of  them. This suggests that success in a dispute grounded
by incompatible desires, rather than beliefs, requires deciding whose desires the
world will  fit;  which state of  affairs  is  to be realised rather than what state of
affairs is realised. 
As  I  see  things,  this  does  not  entail  one  disputant  giving  up  their
competing desire; the disputants could decide which world state is to be brought
about, without one changing their mind and actually wanting that state of  affairs.
Two people could argue over what album to listen to in the car, but then decide
that the driver should get to choose. In this case the passenger may still despise
the driver's music and much prefer the situation where the don't have to listen to
it. The driver has still won the argument. Similarly, in the case of  John and his
mother, John does not need to relinquish his desire to play football in order for
his mother to be successful in the argument; he just needs to not play football. So
in cases grounded by jointly-incompatible desires,  it  seems that success in the
argument comes not from the two disputants  changing their  attitudes so they
4 This is  not  the only  way that  desires can be incompatible.  What I  am advocating here is
something close to Stevenson's conception of  disagreement in attitude.
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align with each other's, but rather, establishing whose desires get satisfied5. In this
way, the aim of  the dispute, because of  the direction of  fit of  the attitudes that
ground it, may be to decide on which state of  affairs is to be realised. 
There  may still  be  preferential  pressure  to change the  other  disputant's
attitudes, but this may come from the fact that changing a person's attitudes will
lead to the state of  affairs we prefer being realised. Desires themselves provide a
motivation to  bring  about  certain  situations,  and part  of  bringing about  your
preferred  situation  may  be  stopping  other  people  from  bringing  about
incompatible situations.  Perhaps this is generalised into a particular norm, for
example:
If  two people disagree in attitude, then they each have a prima facie reason
to change the other person's relevant attitudes6
The classic way to change someone's attitude would be to dispute with them,
hence, why the two parties would have a reason to dispute.  This norm could
perhaps still guide our disputing behaviour in cases of  intractable disagreement.
We are  not  omniscient;  and when it  comes  to  something so  unobservable  as
someone's mental states, frequently there is the epistemic possibility that we could
perhaps change these states by disputing with their holder. This is so, even if  our
disagreement  with  someone  is  intractable.  Likewise  with  our  motivation  to
dispute with someone who disagrees in desire with us; even if  our disagreement
is intractable, the person with conflicting desires to us could still be an obstacle to
us getting what we want. Hence, the motivation for changing their attitudes, even
in cases where we cannot do this. But as we have seen, disputes in attitude can be
pretty  much  settled  without  the  contested  attitudes  changing.  The  settlement
concerns what state of  affairs shall be realised. (What we are concerned with here
is not merely Alan Gibbard's disagreement in plan (2003). Disagreement in plan
5 It may not be the case that all disagreement in pro-attitudes takes this shape. Instead of  merely
wishing to change what the other person will do, a disputant may want to change the other's
relevant desires, because they may see them as intrinsically bad to hold. Perhaps John's mother
may hold that football  is an immoral activity, and so she may see any desire to play it as
indicative of  a moral failing.   
6 This reason would be a prima facie one, because of  potential factors which could override it. 
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would stretch much further than the kinds of  cases we are talking about. At the
moment we are only extending our account to those cases where people have
incompatible desires; we are concerned not with ones where the agents' favoured
states of  affairs are not incompatible. An instance of  the latter could be where
one person desires candy, and another wants to not have candy. Both of  these
desires could be jointly-satisfiable )
So it is clear to see how some disagreements in attitude can ground certain
disputes:  When  two  people  have  conflicting  desires  they  want  jointly
incompatible  states  of  affairs  to  come  about.  This  type  of  disagreement  in
attitude would be most appropriate for grounding disputes over which state of
affairs should be brought about. If  the disputants argue in this manner when they
do not have relevant incompatible desires but think they do, then the dispute is
ungrounded;  the  dispute  cannot  decide  which  of  two  incompatible  states  of
affairs—each favoured by a particular disputant—should be brought about when




f  you have spoken to many evangelical Christians, then you may have heard
one say something along the lines of  “Christianity is not a religion, it's a faith”
or “I don't follow any religion, I follow Jesus Christ!” They might even object to
someone who refers to Christianity as an Abrahamic religion on the grounds that
it is not a religion.  If  a dispute arose from this misuse of  the word 'religion' then
it would be pointless and superficial. Imagine that someone utters a sentence such
as  “Christianity  is  a  religion”  and  an  evangelical  Christian  replies  with  the
sentence “Christianity is not a religion” Our evangelical Christian would clearly
have a different idea of  what counts as a religion from the person who (correctly)
refers to Christianity as one. I suspect that such a dispute would be merely verbal,
so that there would not be anything of  substance (aside from perhaps the correct
use of  language) to it. This would explain why the dispute seems so superficial; at
a first glance, it looks like the two disputants could perhaps agree on matters of
fact  (not  about  linguistic  use)  and  still  argue  over  whether  Christianity  is  a
religion. At the very least,  this dispute would have features common to many
verbal  disputes.  For  instance,  the  dispute  would  evaporate  if  the  disputants
resolved the linguistic issue (the correct usage of  the word “religion”). 
I
Verbal disputes, like this one, would be interesting to philosophers for a
couple  of  reasons.  First,  they  could  show  us  something  interesting  about
language. Second, if  we manage to formulate some good criteria for two parties
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verbally disputing, then we could perhaps use it to show whether certain disputes
in philosophy are verbal.  It is taken that verbal disputes are not worth pursuing
seriously; the best course of  action in a verbal dispute would be to eliminate the
terminological  confusion.  If  the  dispute  is  merely  verbal  then  settling  the
terminology could also eliminate the dispute, or if  it is partly verbal then this
could  show  where  the  real  disagreement  between  the  two  parties  lies.  The
important thing is that the merely terminological aspect of  a dispute should be
eliminated—if  of  course  the  disputants  do  not  intend  to  be  disputing  about
language. This implies that if  certain philosophical disputes are merely verbal,
they should be abandoned. One proponent of  this strategy is Eli Hirsch, who
argues that there is nothing substantively at stake in questions of  the ontology of
physical objects “beyond the correct use of  language” (2005). Other such disputes
in metaphysics which have been taken at some point to be merely verbal include
the dispute over whether free will is compatible with determinism and the dispute
over whether material objects have temporal parts. In this chapter I shall review
some of  the main theories of  verbal disputes, and discuss some of  the features
such a theory should have. 
   
A characterisation of  verbal disputes
In the  last  chapter  we  distinguished disputes  from disagreement.  Two people
would be having a dispute when they are engaged in some argumentative activity.
So that one party would assert a sentence “S” and another would assert “Not-S”
in reply, or at least they would reply with something they believe incompatible
with “S”. On the other hand, disagreement would be a relation between their
mental states, which partly consists7 in them being somehow incompatible. For
7 I say “partly consists” because, as we saw in the previous chapter, mere incompatibility of
mental states may not be sufficient for disagreement. Although I didn't endorse a particular
analysis of  disagreement, I did argue that disapproval of  someone holding an incompatible
attitude  from  oneself  was  characteristic  of  disagreement.  As  I  argued,  the  notion  of
disagreement  also  stands  in  a  justificatory  relation  to  disputing.  These  features  of
disagreement may arise from incompatible attitudes (in conjunction with our human natures),
but they would not be identical to them.  
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example, two parties' beliefs would be incompatible if  one party's were false while
the other's were true. Also, two parties' desires would be incompatible when they
could not both be satisfied. Although in the previous chapter I advocated the view
that we can disagree in our desires, in this chapter I will mainly be concerned
with  disagreement  in  beliefs.  Sometimes  we  use  the  word  'disagreement'  to
describe the argumentative activity, in fact a few writers refer to this as a species
of  disagreement (Cappelen & Hawthorne, 2009: 60-1). These disagreements in
activity seem to be exactly what I call 'disputes', so I will treat the cases Cappelen
and Hawthorne have in mind as such. 
For  our  example  of  a  verbal  dispute,  let's  say  that  Jenny  asserts  the
sentence  “Gordon  is  wearing  pants”,  and  Wolfgang  denies  it.  Despite  the
linguistic behaviour of  Jenny and Wolfgang, they would both agree that Gordon
is wearing underwear with no trousers, and they would both be correct in this.
They would each agree on what the clothing Gordon is wearing looks like, and
furthermore neither would retract their view from further inspection of  Gordon
and  his  attire.  They  are  clearly  having  a  dispute;  they  are  both  exhibiting
argumentative  behaviour,  etc.  But  it  seems  superficial,  as  if  there  is  nothing
grounding the dispute. It  should be uncontroversial  that this dispute is verbal,
what we need is an account on which this dispute comes out as verbal—along
with other disputes which are pointless, nonsubstantive, and shallow in the same
way. 
Are verbal disputes about language?
One idea is that verbal disputes are about language as opposed to the apparent first
order domain which they seem to be about. At a first glance, an account which
relied on this idea would not isolate the class of  disputes we want it to. It would
rule out verbal disputes where the disputants keep their arguments in first order
terms. It would also include disputes which are about language in a way which
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would  not  be  especially  pointless.  Disputes  in  linguistics  and  philosophy  of
language may be about language, but they may not be pointless like the dispute
between Jenny and Wolfgang would be. For instance, two people could argue
over  the  meaning  of  'pants',  because  they  are  trying  to  to  build  a  decent
dictionary entry on the word. The disputants in this case would be self  conscious
about the verbalness of  their dispute, whereas Jenny and Wolfgang would not.
The lexicographers would not be too worried by the charge that their dispute is
terminological.  Furthermore,  arguments  between  lexicographers  may  be
grounded in real disagreement, for example over empirical issues regarding word
usage, whereas Wolfgang and Jenny's dispute appears to be first order and so they
most likely would not resort to empirical arguments about how we use the word
'pants'.
The  disputes  we  are  concerned  with  in  this  essay  are  ones  where  the
verbalness is a defect; in these cases the disputants would not intend to merely
argue over words. A verbal dispute may take place completely, in Manley's words,
“at the object level” (2009: 12); for instance, Jenny may not believe Wolfgang is
mistaken about  the  meaning of  'pants,'  but  rather  that  he  was  looking at  the
wrong person, or his vision was failing him, or the sun caught his eyes, and so on.
In this case we can say the disputants are each concerned with what Gordon is
wearing, not merely with what words they use to describe Gordon's attire. (There
are  more sophisticated ways of  cashing out the idea that  certain disputes  are
about language, which we will consider in a later section.)
So, simply saying that verbal disputes are about language not only includes
many disputes which may well be worth pursuing, but also excludes the disputes
we are concerned with; namely the ones where the disputants are unaware that
their dispute boils down to the use of  words. The cases we are concerned with are
the  ones  where  the  disputants  do  not  know the  full  extent  of  their  dispute's
verbalness.  (These may even encompass disputes about language, for instance,
David Chalmers suggests disputes over the semantic-pragmatic distinction may be
verbal  (2011:  532).)  We need an account  to  cover  cases which are  not  about
language,  or  at  least  are  more verbal  than they seem. Especially so when we
factor in the second reason for studying verbal disputes; that certain philosophical
disputes may be verbal without us knowing. 
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Do the parties to a verbal dispute disagree?
Another putative explanation of  why disputes like the one between Jenny and
Wolfgang are verbal is that the disputants do not disagree; they just talk past one
another.  By this  I  mean that  they  do not  have conflicting  non metalinguistic
beliefs8. Sure, they may disagree on matters of  language, for instance, on what
word  to  use  to  denote  such-and-such  item  of  clothing;  but  they  would  not
disagree on nonlinguistic matters. Now, this explanation is too simple. For a start,
it is clear that two parties can be involved in a verbal dispute, and yet still disagree
on certain matters. The verbalness of  Jenny and Wolfgang's dispute would not be
affected by them disagreeing on what Gordon's birthday is.
The definition may also exclude a great number of  disputes in the way it
explains the disputants' lack of  disagreement. One may say, for example, that the
sentence  “Gordon  is  wearing  pants”  expresses  different  propositions  in  the
respective mouths of  Jenny and Wolfgang; Jenny would express that Gordon is
wearing underwear, but Wolfgang would express that Gordon is wearing trousers.
In  this  way,  Jenny's  utterance  of  the  sentence  would  be  compatible  with
Wolfgang's  utterance  of  its  negation;  surely  Jenny  saying  Gordon  is  wearing
underwear is compatible with Wolfgang saying that he is not wearing trousers. 
It is not clear that the sentence “Gordon is wearing pants” wouldn't mean
different things in each others respective mouths. Hilary Putnam argued that the
meanings of  natural-kind terms “just ain't in the head,” they also depend on the
speaker's environment. Others, like Tyler Burge, have since extended this thought
to other kinds of  words and to the content of  psychological states. Burge (1979)
argues  that  someone's  linguistic  environment—their  linguistic  community—
8 I take it that disagreement is best cashed out in terms of  two parties belief  content. It neither
depends on what they say conflicting, or even on the two parties having a dispute. One may be
dishonest and actually agree with the other party, and I may disagree with someone who I
have never met. 
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determines what their words express. If  Jenny and Wolfgang are both part of  a
linguistic  community  where  'pants'  denotes  trousers,  then  one  of  them
(Wolfgang) just says something false. Not only that, but Burge would say that the
belief  Wolfgang expresses when he says “Gordon is not wearing pants” is false. In
this  way Jenny and  Wolfgang  would  perhaps disagree  in  some sense,  as  they
would believe incompatible propositions.  It  is  in this  way that  a definition of
verbal  disputes  could not  simply say that  the  disputants  do not  disagree  over
nonlinguistic  matters  and  then  leave  it  at  that.  Accounting  for  externalism—
especially the social externalism of  Burge—is necessary for a theory of  verbal
disputes. 
A  verbal  dispute  is  then  not  characterised  by  having  no  disagreement
present  at  all  between the  disputants,  or  by  having no  disagreement  over  the
subject  matter  of  the  dispute.  But  this  is  not  to  say  that  our  notion  of
disagreement is unimportant for the investigation into verbal disputes. The best
strategy,  I  take  it,  is  something  rather  like  what  Chalmers  presents  in  Verbal
Disputes, where disagreement is allowed, providing the dispute (and presumably,
any disagreement over the subject matter of  the dispute) arises from a certain
source. I will detail Chalmers's account later on in the chapter, but for now let us
note that his  placing importance of  where a dispute arises  from is something
echoed by the previous chapter. In fact, a (very vague) way of  stating Chalmers's




A feature of  verbal disputes relating to the issue of  semantic externalism is that
the verbalness of  a dispute depends more on factors intrinsic to the disputants
than  to  their  environment.  For  almost  any  verbal  dispute  we  can  imagine  a
counterfactual scenario where a social externalist would say that the disputants
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(or intrinsic duplicates of  them) disagree (Chalmers, 2011: 520).  For example,
above we considered the case where, rather than coming from separate linguistic
communities which use 'pants' differently, Jenny and Wolfgang could come from
the  same  community  with  a  single  fixed  meaning  for  the  word.  This
counterfactual dispute would still be verbal; it would suffer from the same defects
as other verbal disputes.
We can perhaps extend this thought further, so that when two parties A
and B are having a verbal dispute, then if  intrinsic duplicates of  them, A1 and B1,
had the same dispute—argued with the same words, the dispute arose in virtue of
the  same divergence in linguistic  usage,  etc.—then A1 and B1 would be in a
verbal dispute whatever environment they were in. We can call this verbal dispute
internalism (VDI). This is unlike the case of  mental content where the externalist
would say that a persons belief  could have different content depending on their
environment.  The  interesting  thing  to  note  here  is  that  we  can  accept  the
externalist picture of  mental states and VDI.
A  few  provisos  here.  First.  the  disputants'  doppelgängers  would  be
intrinsic duplicates with the same physical constitution and the same (or at least
very similar) brain activity at any given moment. As a result of  this, they would
be disposed to behave identically, in that they would make the same motions, say
the same sentences, etc. So there is a natural restriction on the environment here,
i.e. the counterfactual environment must be such that the disputants couldn't tell
the  difference  between  the  two environments,  the  disputants  wouldn't  behave
differently, etc. Second, this thesis is not that the state of  being in a verbal dispute
is not relational. In fact I would say it is essentially relational: Agreement and
disagreement  is  the  relation  between  multiple  peoples'  mental  states,  and
disputing  is  a  relation  between  two  people  where  they  attempt  to  resolve
disagreement.  However,  it  does  not  matter  to  much  which  environment  the
disputants are related to each other in, for the dispute to be merely verbal. 
This has something in common with the view of  mental content Jackson
and Braddon-Mitchell present (2007). They say of  content that “We understand
it, at least in part,  in terms of  interactions with things around us—inputs and
outputs  described  in  distal  terms”  but  they  add  that  “it  does  not follow that
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content is not narrow in an important sense” (215). They state “The narrowness
of  narrow content is is constituted not by its being independent of  interactions
with,  and  relations  to,  the  environment,  but  rather  by  the  fact  that  which
interactions  are  actual  and  which  possible  does  not  matter”  (216).  They  see
narrow  content  as  reflecting  the  way  a  subject  would  behave,  etc.  in  certain
situations;  but  the  way  a  subject  would  interact  with  an  environment  is
determined by their internal nature, and their internal nature may cause them to
act  the  same way in  perceptually  indistinguishable,  but  nevertheless  different,
situations. 
The  nature  of  verbal  disputes  is  analogous  to  Jackson  and  Braddon-
Mitchell's view of  content in this way: A verbal dispute is verbal in virtue of  the
subjects' mental states and their relation to one another. They are also relational
in virtue of  mental content (which most would agree is relational) playing a key
role  in  the  explanation  of  verbal  disputes.  However,  although verbal  disputes
involve essential reference to the subjects' interactions with one another and their
environment,  what  the  actual  environment  is  does  not  matter.  Jenny  and
Wolfgang's internal states and their argumentative behaviour together entail that
in  almost  any  environment  their  dispute  will  be  verbal.  I  say  'almost  any
environment' because there may be possible situations where the natural laws are
different from the Jenny and Wolfgang's world which may mean that they are not
involved in a verbal dispute.
Against this position, one could perhaps formulate an externalist account
of  verbal  disputes.  This account would say that  the environment  does make a
difference to whether a  dispute is  verbal  or not.  So that  Jenny and Wolfgang
would be in a verbal dispute when they are from separate linguistic communities.
But in the case of  them belonging to the same community, they would not be in a
verbal  dispute because of  their shared language.  As we have seen, this would
perhaps not be a good move. Chalmers points out that saying a dispute like this is
not  verbal  because  the  disputants  do  not  disagree—do  not  express  different
propositions by uttering the disputed sentence—misses the point. The two cases
feature  the  same kind  of  triviality  and so  our  explanation of  verbal  disputes
should encompass both. If  we find out that the latter case features disagreement
then  the  correct  response  would  be  to  say  that  non-disagreement  is  not  a
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necessary condition for being in a verbal dispute, rather than proclaiming that the
dispute cannot be verbal. Thus, we should be internalists about verbal disputes. 
Hirsch on verbal disputes
Eli Hirsch has been one of  the more prolific writers  when it  comes to verbal
disputes.  His  view of  what  a  verbal  dispute  is  evolves  throughout  his  work,
however a theme running through all  of  it is the idea that certain disputes in
metaphysics are merely verbal. I shall only cover two different definitions; one
from  Dividing Reality and another from his later work (2005, 2009) in terms of
imagined linguistic communities. 
In  Dividing  Reality Hirsch states  that  a  dispute  is  verbal  if  it  meets  the
following conditions:
The Equivalence Condition:  For any controversial sentence S within the dispute,
there  are  two sentences Sa and Sb (the “reconciling sentences”)  such that  (i)
neither  Sa  or  Sb  is  controversial,  and  (ii)  one  disputant  believes  that  S  is
equivalent to Sa and the other believes that S is equivalent to Sb (1993: 181). 
The  Consistency  condition:  Each  disputant’s  position  with  respect  to  the
controversial  sentences  is  consistent  with  what  the  disputant  would  say  after
further  observation  or  argument,  discounting  empirical  arguments  about  the
conventions of  language (1993: 182).
(As when talking about other verbal disputes, I assume that the two disputants
each are asserting seemingly contradictory sentences, e.g. “S” and “Not-S”.) The
consistency  condition  is  there  to  rule  out  cases  of  inadequate  reflection.  For
example, someone may take the word 'vehicle' to only apply to land vehicles like
cars  and  lorries,  because  they  don't  associate  the  term with  air-vehicles  (e.g.
planes) or sea-vehicles (e.g. boats). But if  they were to consider and reflect on
these cases then they would come to realise that planes and boats are vehicles too.
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Note that because it discounts “empirical arguments about the conventions of
language”, the definition would still include cases where a semantic externalist
would say the  disputants  do not disagree.  In the case where they both speak
British-English, Wolfgang may well accept that Gordon is wearing pants if  Jenny
says “In Great Britain we use the word 'pants' to refer to trousers” and points out
that he is diverging from established usage. Jenny and Wolfgang's dispute seems
to meet this condition. If  all of  Jenny's arguments are for a position consistent
with holding that  Gordon is  wearing trousers,  and Wolfgang really does take
'pants' to refer to trousers, then any argument (except ones concerned with the
use of  language) for Jenny's position will be consistent with Wolfgang's. 
The pants case would also meet the equivalence condition. Let's call the
sentence  “Gordon  is  wearing  pants”  S.  Jenny  would  believe  it  equivalent  to
“Gordon is  wearing  underwear” and Wolfgang would believe it  equivalent  to
“Gordon  is  wearing  trousers.”  Neither  of  the  latter  two  sentences  would  be
controversial for either disputant. So at a first glance seems that Hirsch's (early)
definition covers this case.
However, as Chalmers points out, if  a dispute met Hirsch's conditions then
the dispute would indeed be verbal, but the conditions wouldn't be necessary. For
a start,  the disputants may not take each respective reconciling sentence to be
equivalent, in a strict sense, with the sentence S; strict equivalences seem hard to
come by in real life (2011: 519). Another problem for this characterisation is that
there may be no reconciling sentences. Perhaps the term 'underwear'  is  not in
Jenny's vocabulary; she may not believe the word 'pants' to be a synonym for any
other word or complex expression. She may have learnt the word by ostension, so
her only criterion for something being a pair of  pants is that it be 'something like
that'  (when gesturing at a pair  of  pants).  In this way we could not formulate
reconciling sentences for her and Wolfgang's dispute. 
These worries may be part of  the reason why Hirsch characterises verbal
disputes  differently  in  later  work.  He  says  “The  general  characterisation  of  a
verbal  dispute  is  one  in  which  the  controversial  sentences  are  most  plausibly
interpreted as having different truth conditions, so that each position turns out to
be correct in its associated language” (2005: 72). So if  the disputants were just
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speaking  in  different  languages—or  rather  different  idiolects—they  wouldn't
contradict each other even though they appear to. This may appear to directly
contradict social externalism, but Hirsch's account is made more nuanced by his
appeal to imagined linguistic communities9. David Chalmers gives us an accurate
summary of  Hirsch's second characterisation: 
Two parties A and B are having a verbal dispute iff, were A and B to inhabit an
A-community and a B-community (respectively) in which everyone exhibits the
same sort of  linguistic behaviour that A and B actually exhibit (respectively), then
on the correct view of  linguistic interpretation, A and B would agree that both
speak the truth in their own language. (From Chalmers, 2011: 521, paraphrased
from Hirsch, 2009: 238–40.)
According  to  Hirsch,  the  correct  view  of  linguistic  interpretation  is  the
assignment of  truth conditions based on the principle of  charity, that is, we try
and  interpret  the  parties'  respective  linguistic  behaviour  as  being  maximally
truthful and rational (2005: 71). This initially does not seem to help much, as the
correct  view  of  linguistic  interpretation  may  have  to  take  into  account  the
deferential dispositions of  the parties. If  Wolfgang is a British-English speaker
then he will likely defer to established usage in Britain, so according to social-
externalism,  he  will  be  most  plausibly  interpreted  as  saying  something  false.
However,  things  seem different  when we  imagine  two  linguistic  communities
whose respective usage roughly corresponds to the usage of  Jenny and Wolfgang;
so we would have one community which would use 'pants' to refer to underwear
and another which would use the same word to refer to trousers. We could call
the former's language J-English and the latter's W-English, so that the sentences
Jenny asserts about Gordon would be true in J-English and Wolfgang's in W-
English. If  Jenny inhabited the J-English community and Wolfgang inhabited the
W-English community then they would not disagree over the subject matter of
the  dispute;  they  should both  agree  that  they  would speak the  truth  in  their
respective languages. 
This characterisation can account for cases where one disputant does not
9 Of course, in the case of  Jenny and Wolfgang actually belonging to different linguistic 
communities we do not need to imagine them, as they already exist in the form or British and 
American English.
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believe that S is equivalent to another non controversial sentence. Hirsch states
that the same sentence S would plausibly be interpreted as having different truth
conditions  in  different  languages.  This  would  be  in  the  same  way  that
phonetically and typographically identical expressions in different languages may
have different meanings, for instance, the words 'sensitive' and 'bar' have different
meanings, respectively, in Italian and English10. The sentence S having different
truth conditions in J-English and W-English would be entirely compatible with
the disputants not believing S to be equivalent to any other sentence not involving
the word 'pants'.
A potential problem with Hirsch's later characterisation is in the way it is
supposed to be compatible with social-externalism. We can see how Hirsch takes
it to be so from the quote below:
If  Burge's  view applies  to  this  example,  it  implies  that  A is  not  speaking (or
thinking in) A-English (or in a corresponding private idiolect); rather A has the
mistaken  thoughts  and  beliefs  that  are  expressed  by  her  assertions  in  plain
English. I'm not entering into that question.  What is important for my purposes is
that the sentences asserted by A are true in A-English, so that the only real question is
whether A-English is plain English. This is why the dispute with A is merely verbal.  In
effect  I  am redefining  “A's  idiolect”  to  mean the  (imagined)  public  language
associated with A's position. This redefined sense of  “A's idiolect” captures the
relevant sense in which “A is right in A's idiolect (and we are right in ours)”
(2005: 70 (my emphasis)).
(Here A is someone who believes that glasses count as cups. A-English identical
to plain English except for the word “cup” also applying to glasses. So the A-
community would be a group of  people who spoke A-English.)
From the emphasised part of  the quote we can see that Hirsch interprets
the question over whether the glass is a cup (in the context of  his example), as a
question about language; presumably it is something like 'Does the word 'cup' also
denote glasses?' and the obvious answer—because Hirsch says that the disputants
both claim to be talking plain English—is whatever is correct  in plain English (or
rather,  the language the disputants speak).  This is  why he appeals to separate
10 Thank you `to Ambra D'Antone for the example.
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linguistic communities; if  the question is about what language plain-English is
then the  question could be  formulated as “Is  plain  English A-English (where
glasses count as cups) or B-English (where glasses do not count as cups)?”
But if  we leave it at that, the account may face the difficulties raised for
accounts which describe verbal disputes as being about language (Manley, 2009:
12). So, perhaps by being 'about language' Hirsch means that the disputes are
covertly about language. But what would this mean? If  the dispute does not appear
to  be  about  language—e.g.  if  it  was  formally  identical  to  a  nonlinguistically
substantive dispute—then what would this aboutness consist in? 
Perhaps we could say that a dispute is covertly about language just in case
it could be dissolved by reflection on language; if  we solved the linguistic issue
then the whole dispute would (hopefully) disappear.  This would be consistent
with Hirsch's statement that the only “real question at issue is which language is
plain  English” (2005:  70).  Once we  see  which language is  plain  English  and
adjust our linguistic behaviour accordingly, then we have resolved the dispute.
Also see how Hirsch's use of  linguistic communities fits  into this.  If  the only
relevant question is which way of  speaking is the correct way, then the question
can be rephrased as asking which linguistic community most correlates to ours;
should we speak like the A-community or the B-community?
This strategy may well work. But notice that it would very much weakens
the  claim  that  a  dispute  is  about  language.  The  way  it  is  about  language
corresponds  more  to  the  way in which we could resolve the  dispute  or  what
actual issue is in the vicinity, rather than the natural way which would be the
disputants  consciously  trying  to  address  a  metalinguistic  issue.  This  does  not
matter very much at all though; the important thing to notice is that it shows how
the only real question in a verbal dispute is what language is the correct one to
use. 
Now a problem that Chalmers raises for Hirsch's (later) definition is that it
cannot account for certain other cases of  semantic externalism; ones where the
deference to the linguistic community is not at issue in the dispute.  Chalmers
mentions disputes where inadequate reflection is the source of  the dispute such as
this:
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Suppose that A and B agree that Sue made a false statement that she did not
believe to be false, and also agree on the moral status of  Sue’s assertion and other
relevant properties. A says ‘Sue did not lie’. B initially says ‘Sue lied’, believing
falsely that ‘lie’ refers to any false statement, but on reflection comes to accept
‘Sue did not lie’, through reflection on the concept of  lying . . . But, they are
having  a  broadly  verbal  dispute  all  the  same:  intuitively,  they  agree  on  the
important facts of  the case and are merely disagreeing on whether the word ‘lie’
should be used to describe it (2011: 520-1).
Why could Hirsch’s characterisation of  a verbal dispute not accommodate this
case? The reason is that it would be strange for there to be a B-community if  B
does not even have a proper handle on her concepts. We can see this with the
example of  a pre-Gettier philosopher who argues that knowledge is justified true
belief.  This philosopher may argue that  the concept they possess  is  JTB, they
could even describe Gettier scenarios as cases of  knowledge; but they may realise
that they have been applying the term incorrectly, perhaps because they realise
knowledge is,  for example,  reliable by definition and JTB doesn't  give us this
result.11 In the same way, B may realise that applying the term 'lie' in the way that
they  do,  is  irrational;  for  instance,  lying  may  have  some  kind  of  moral
implications, which B finds hard to balance with her belief  that Sue did not do
anything morally wrong. This is not to say that there could not be a B-community
where everyone takes “lie” to denote any false statement. This community would
just not represent B and the meaning she attaches to 'lie'. Furthermore, because B
is irrational in their employment of  the disputed term, we may not—or rather we
should not—interpret their statements charitably. Thus, Hirsch's later definition
would have trouble accounting for this case. Even Hirsch's early definition would
face  a  similar  problem  because  the  consistency  condition  entails  that  the
disputants'  positions  are  consistent  with  what  they  would  say  after  further
reflection. B's utterence “Sue lied” could be dissolved by this reflection, so they
would not meet the consistency condition. But this case would still clearly be a
verbal dispute.
11 Thank you to Jessica Brown for the example.
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Chalmers on verbal disputes
What we learnt in in the last section is that we need a theory of  verbal disputes to
cover cases where each disputant  may not believe that  different  sentences  are
equivalent to the disputed sentence. We also need it to encompass disputes which
are  not  obviously  about language,  and  ones  where  the  disputants  may  have
contradictory beliefs as a result of  one disputant's semantic deviance. Chalmers
recognises this and so his definition gets over the worries we had about Hirsch's
definitions.  Chalmers  presents  what  he  calls  the  narrow conception of  verbal
disputes:
A dispute over S is narrowly verbal iff  S expresses distinct propositions p and q
for the two parties, so that one party asserts p and the other denies q~, and the
parties agree on the truth of  p and ~q (2011: 519).
Now  the  narrow  conception  would  encompass  disputes  between  different
linguistic communities, for example, it would cover the dispute between Jenny
and Wolfgang if  the former was from Britain and the latter was from America.
However, it would not cover the dispute if  both disputants were part of  the same
linguistic community as then they would both defer to, say British-English usage.
In the latter case an externalist like Burge would say that the sentence “Gordon is
wearing pants”  would express  the same proposition for each disputant; namely,
whatever  proposition  the  usage  of  the  sentence  for  the  relevant  linguistic
community expresses. The correct reaction to the latter case would not be to say
that such a dispute is not verbal, but rather to say that it is a particular type of
verbal dispute, namely what Chalmers calls a broadly verbal dispute:
A dispute over S is broadly verbal when, for some expression T in S, the parties
disagree about the meaning of  T, and the dispute over S arises wholly in virtue of
this disagreement regarding T (2011: 522).
The broad characterisation—which also encompasses narrowly verbal disputes—
would  include  those  disputes  where  the  disputants  may  not  express  different
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propositions with a sentence S, but which have the same faults as the disputes
which do. Jenny and Wolfgang clearly disagree over the meaning of  'pants,' and
this disagreement plays a key explanatory role when we account for this dispute;
the  dispute  would  not  arise  at  all  if  it  were  not  for  Jenny  and  Wolfgang's
divergent uses of  language. This key explanatory role is what Chalmers identifies
with the 'in-virtue-of' relation between the metalinguistic disagreement and the
dispute (2011: 523).  It  is the broad definition I shall  be concerned with when
discussing Chalmers in the following sections unless otherwise specified.
Chalmers's broad definition of  verbal disputes clearly has advantages over
both of  Hirsch's. For a start, unlike Hirsch's first definition, it would not require
both disputants to believe in an equivalence between the disputed sentence and
two different respective sentences. Jenny could have no other word for underwear
other than pants, but still disagree with Wolfgang over the meaning of  'pants',
perhaps  in  the  way  she  would  apply  the  word  across  possible  cases.  Also,
Chalmers can account for disputes which are not about language (in the strong
sense).  Metalinguistic  disagreement  can explain a dispute  without  the  dispute
being about language. A dispute can take place entirely at the object level whist
the  only  real  disagreement  is  metalinguistic.  For  instance,  the  dispute  over
whether  Gordon  is  wearing  pants  could  be  first  order—with  the  disputants
perhaps  criticising  each  others'  vision—whist  the  metalinguistic  disagreement
gives rise to the dispute. However, using metalinguistic disagreement to define
verbal disputes may cause some problems for Chalmers, as I shall explain below.
I the next few sections I shall look at where some potential opposition to
Chalmers could come from. I aim to defend Chalmers's  account (or one very
much like it) from these objections. I will suggest some positive changes, in line
with what other writers like Herman Cappelen and C. S. I. Jenkins say, but these
will not affect what I think is the key insight of  Chalmers's account, which is that
verbal disputes are those which arise in in a certain way. This thesis has certain
similarities to what I present in the first  chapter; there I argue that we accept
norms  entailing  that  a  dispute  should  be  grounded  by  the  right  kind  of
disagreement.
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Wholly, Partly, and Merely Verbal Disputes
Chalmers  importantly  talks  about  wholly verbal  disputes  as  opposed  to  partly
verbal  disputes.  A  wholly  verbal  dispute  would  fit  his  definition  of  a  verbal
dispute  in  that  the  dispute  arises  wholly  in  virtue  of  the  meaning  of  some
expression. On the other hand a partly verbal dispute is one where the “apparent
first order disagreement arises partly in virtue of  the metalinguistic disagreement
and partly in virtue of  a substantive non-metalinguistic disagreement” (2011: 525-
6). 
The subject we wish to engage with is closer to the wholly rather than the
partly verbal dispute. The reason for this is that, generally, it would be a far more
damaging for a dispute if  it was wholly instead of  partly verbal. Philosophers
who take metaphysical disputes to be verbal usually take it to be a problem with
the subject matter, so that there really would be nothing more to the dispute than
choosing a particular language. If  a metaphysical dispute is partly verbal, then
this means that there could be still something substantive at issue in the dispute,
only perhaps not what the disputants originally thought was at issue. In this way,
a dispute being partly verbal would not warrant deflationism about the subject
matter of  the dispute. This is not to say that showing a dispute to be partly verbal
is a useless result. Chalmers for example, states “the diagnosis of  verbal disputes
has the potential to serve as a sort of  universal acid in philosophical discussion,
either  dissolving  disagreements  or  boiling  them  down  to  the  fundamental
disagreements on which they turn” (2011: 517). In this way, if  a dispute is wholly
verbal  it  will  be dissolved. If  it  is  partly verbal,  it  will  be boiled down to the
fundamental disagreement. 
There is a further distinction to be made here, one which we have already
alluded to.  It  is  the  one between  wholly and  merely verbal  disputes.  Although
Chalmers  mentions  merely—as  opposed  to  wholly—verbal  disputes,  he
acknowledges Jenkins in a footnote about it, and Jenkins has a later paper about
the distinction (Jenkins: 2014).  
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In informal terms, the difference between a merely and a wholly verbal
dispute is that the former is one where nothing non-linguistic is at issue but where
it appears as if  there is. A wholly verbal dispute would be one where the issue is
verbal  but  the speakers  do not necessarily intend that  there be  anything non-
linguistic at issue. An example of  a wholly verbal dispute could be a situation
where the participants are arguing over the meaning of  a particular word. There
would  not  clearly  be  anything  non-linguistically  substantive  at  issue  in  this
dispute; this would be fine with the participants as they know they are arguing
about language. In this way merely verbal disputes would be a subset of  wholly
verbal disputes; the set of  wholly verbal disputes in which there is an appearance
of  non-linguistic disagreement in the surface dispute. We already touched upon
this distinction in the section on Hirsch and noted that accommodating  merely
verbal disputes, the ones which are not about language, was a potential problem
for him. Jenkins’s definition of  a merely verbal dispute is as follows.
MVD: Parties A and B are having a merely verbal dispute iff  they are engaged in
a sincere prima facie dispute D, but do not disagree over the subject matter(s) of
D, and merely present the appearance of  doing so owing to their divergent uses
of  some relevant portion of  language (2014: 21).
Jenkins intends for merely verbal disputes to be wholly verbal in Chalmers sense,
in that in the disputes are not partly verbal and partly non-verbal. But she also
wants  to  make  the  further  claim  that  in  merely  verbal  disputes  there  is  the
appearance of  the dispute being about something non-linguistically substantive.
She attempts to capture those verbal disputes which seem inappropriate to carry
on with once it has been pointed out there is nothing substantive at issue (2014:
11).  This is  an important  point;  when a philosophical  dispute is dismissed as
verbal, it is usually taken as a given that the disputants do not know that the
dispute  is  verbal.  Often  disputes  in  metaphysics  are  the  target  of  the  verbal
dispute  strategy.  These  disputes  are  typically  taken  (by  metaphysicians)  to  be
fundamental and substantive; so the charge that these are merely verbal disputes
would  be  unwelcome  to  a  thoroughgoing  realist  about  the  subject  matter.
Disputes such as these do not  prima facie appear to be about language (to the
disputants  at  any  rate)  and  so  the  charge  that  they  are  verbal  is  far  more
damaging  to  them  than  a  dispute  over,  say,  the  correct  pronunciation  of
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'Worcestershire'. The charge that a dispute is partly verbal does not have the same
force. The implication is that if  a dispute is partly verbal there may be something
substantive at issue, and that we just need to rephrase the dispute so as to avoid
speaking past  one another.  I  will  not  go into detail  about Jenkins's  theory in
general, the moral of  this section is that an account of  verbal disputes should be
able to intelligibly isolate the disputes which are merely verbal. 
Can Chalmers's  account  do this?  I  believe it  can simply with an extra
condition  stating  that  merely  verbal  disputes  are  the  ones  which  meet  his
definition of  a 'broadly verbal dispute' and where “usage of  the key term is not
itself  a central object of  concern” (2011: 525).
Metalinguistic disagreement
One objection Chalmers anticipates is that metalinguistic disagreement may not
play any key explanatory role in verbal disputes at all; either because users of  a
word  do  not  need  beliefs  about  its  meaning,  or  because  the  metalinguistic
disagreement may not give rise to the apparent first-order disagreement (it may be
the  other  way  around).   Let's  use  our  comfortable  and  familiar  example  to
illustrate this  objection,  in particular  the former version.  Jenny and Wolfgang
may not need any beliefs about the word 'pants' in order to be having a verbal
dispute over whether Gordon is wearing them. As Herman Cappelen points out,
a speaker may use an expression E, and have beliefs about E, without having any
beliefs about the meaning of  E. Cappelen states that he doesn't think “there's an
interesting  subset  of  beliefs  of  the  form 'Es  are  G'  that  are  beliefs  about  the
meaning of  'E' and a theory of  verbal disputes shouldn't require that we be able to
make that distinction” (2013: 44). Perhaps Jenny could believe that pants are an
item of  clothing which typical people wear under trousers and superheroes wear
over trousers, without believing anything of  the word 'pants.' 
I will keep out of  the debate concerning whether there is such a subset of
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beliefs, but if  there isn't then it would perhaps be fatal to Chalmers's account as it
stands. Inspired by Jenkin's account, Chalmers could perhaps refine his account
so  that  he  talks  about  the  disputants'  divergent  uses  of  language  instead  of
metalinguistic disagreement. Then his broad account would look something like
this: 
A dispute over S is broadly verbal when, for some expression T in S, the parties
use (or are disposed to use) T in different ways, and the dispute over S arises
wholly in virtue of  this divergence in the usage of  (or the disposition to use) T.
We could also stipulate that, not only the dispute, but also any disagreement over
the subject matter of  the dispute would arise from the divergent uses of  language
in a verbal dispute. So that in the case where Jenny and Wolfgang  inhabit the
same linguistic community, their disagreement over whether Gordon is wearing
pants,  arises  wholly  from  their  dispositions  to  use  language,  than  from their
dispositions to behave otherwise.
This  would be to block cases where the dispute arises  in virtue of  the
divergent  uses  of  language,  but  where,  independently,  there  is  relevant
disagreement. Examples of  this could be seen in disputes between experts and
novices.  For  instance  a  white-belt  in  Judo  could  say,  while  watching  a
competition “Wow what a stunning O goshi” and their sensei may reply “No that
was a stunning  uki goshi.” The dispute clearly arises  because the novice used
language differently from the expert—if  the white-belt had used the correct term
then  the  dispute  wouldn't  have  occurred—but  there  would  be  disagreement
between  the  two,  which  would  not  arise  in  virtue  of  their  divergent  uses  of
language.  The  two  throws  look  very  similar,  in  fact  so  similar  that  it  would
probably take a relatively experienced judoka to tell the difference between them
—the main difference being that in performing an O goshi you sit lower and use a
pulling motion, as opposed to an uki goshi where you use a twisting motion. The
novice judoka may know that in an O goshi you pull your opponent over your hip
(it is often the first throw you learn) but may not actually know that there is a
similar throw called 'Uki goshi' where it doesn't. As a result of  their untrained
eyes, the novice could perhaps think that the victor of  the Judo match did pull
their opponent over their hip. In this case the disagreement between the novice
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and the sensei could be cashed out in terms of  whether they think the competitor
in question threw their opponent over their hip or not. 
The in-virtue-of  relation
A very important aspect of  Chalmers's broadly verbal disputes is the in-virtue-of
relation;  a  dispute  over  S  would  be  broadly  verbal  if  it  arose  in  virtue  of
metalinguistic  disagreement  over  the  meaning of  some expression  in  S.  Now,
Chalmers does give us a hint at what he means by 'in-virtue-of.' He states:
Here, as elsewhere in philosophy, one may have to take something in this vicinity
as primitive, but one can at least offer some clarification.  I think this should be
understood as an  explanatory  “in virtue of ”: the idea is that the metalinguistic
disagreement  explains  the apparent  first-order  disagreement. And the relevant
sort of  explanation should require something stronger than an arbitrary causal or
evidential  explanation:  it  would  not  suffice,  for  example,  for  a  metalinguistic
disagreement to cause personal enmity that then causes first-order disagreement
(2011: 523).
This sounds slightly mysterious, so it is not clear whether or not any criticism
(apart  from mystery)  will  stick.  As is  clear from the quote,  a counterexample
where  Jenny and Wolfgang's  metalinguistic  disagreement  over  'pants'  leads to
them being at loggerheads, which itself  causes their dispute over who's turn it is
to take out the dustbin, would not be on the right track at all. Nevertheless, I will
present a potential flaw with the definition. 
One type of  case which this definition may have trouble with where the
dispute arises wholly in virtue of  metalinguistic disagreement over the disputed
sentence S, and where there is still relevant, non-linguistic disagreement. Take for
example a dispute between Jeff,  who asserts the sentence “there is beer in the
fridge” and Sheila, who denies it. Let's say that the dispute arises because Jeff
takes cheap lager to be beer and Sheila does not; Sheila is the more discerning
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drinker of  the two. They both sit in Jeff's living room where they discuss different
types of  alcohol, and it comes out that Jeff  only buys cheap lager. He then later
on says that he could get a beer from his fridge for them both. Sheila, however,
corrects him by saying that “there is no beer in your fridge” because she does not
take lager to count as beer and she knows that Jeff  only buys lager. However, a
further detail to this case is that, unbeknownst to Jeff, but known to Sheila (she
had a peek whilst nabbing a yoghurt earlier in the evening), there is no lager (or
ale) in the fridge (let's say that this fact wasn't in her mind when she corrected
Jeff). So the objection would go, even though in this case the dispute arose wholly
because  of  the  metalinguistic  disagreement,  the  dispute  is  not  merely  verbal
because  the  disputants  disagree  on  a  relevant  matter,  i.e.  the  contents  of  the
fridge.
Now as shown, some disagreement is permissible in a verbal dispute—in
fact Chalmers's definition is designed to accommodate it—but it must be the right
kind of  disagreement. We would allow irrelevant disagreement, such as Jenny
and  Wolfgang's  relative  stances  on  why  a  raven  is  like  a  writing  desk;  or
disagreement  as  a  result  of  semantic  deviance,  like  Jenny  and  Wolfgang's
disagreement on whether Gordon is wearing pants, when they are part of  the
same linguistic community. Now the disagreement in this case is not of  either
type. Unlike the former, it is relevant to the dispute (it expresses the disagreement
between Sheila and Jeff  over the sentence “there is no beer in the fridge”), and
unlike the latter it is relatively independent from the way the disputants would
apply  the  disputed  term  across  possible  cases.  Perhaps  an  account  such  as
Jenkins's, would do better. Recall, she says that verbal disputants (or in her terms,
'prima facie disputants') do not disagree over the subject matter of  the dispute.
This would seem to exclude the case of  Sheila and Jeff, as they clearly disagree
over a relevant matter, i.e.  whether the fridge is bare or not.
I don't think this objection would work. One of  the main ideas in the last
chapter was that our practice of  disputing suggests strongly that we view disputes
not standing in the appropriate relation to disagreement as unjustified; for us, the
right kind of  disagreement reflects the subject matter of  the dispute and grounds
it. The reason for this, I argue, is tied to the default purpose that disputing serves
for  us,  i.e.  it  is  supposed  to  resolve  disagreement.  I  am not  saying here  that
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disputing intrinsically has this purpose, nor am I saying that it can be used for no
other  purpose.  What  I  am saying  is  that  our  practice  of  disputing  seems  to
suggest that we accept that disputing is 'for' resolving disagreement. 
Take  this  example:  one  person  may  dispute  with  another  with  the
intention to annoy them. The purpose that the first person has in mind does not
require that their disagreement be resolved; in fact it does not even require that
the disputants disagree at all. However, disputing can be appropriate for bringing
about this intended result because of  the parties' conventional understanding that
the  primary  purpose  of  disputing  is  to  resolve  disagreement.  If  one  person
sincerely tries to resolve disagreement in favour of  their view, the implication is
that they take their beliefs to be true and their opponent's to be false. But as we
saw, we view false beliefs as not merely false but also  incorrect,  and so apt for
being changed.  In this way, someone may be annoyed at being told they have
false beliefs;  they are essentially being told their belief  system is defective,  for
believing false  things  is  a  flaw (of  course  we all  have some false  beliefs,  but
nobody's perfect). Of  course, this may only work on a certain type of  person, e.g.
one who places a lot of  value on having true beliefs. But we can at least see why
they would place such value on this, and why they would be offended at being
told  their  beliefs  do  not  meet  this  standard  (“Who are  you  to  tell  me  I am
wrong?”).
My  account  in  the  last  chapter  is  relevant  to  a  defence  of  Chalmers
definition  of  verbal  disputes  because  a  consequence  of  it  is  that  not  all
disagreement will ground a dispute in the right way. This is because not just any
old dispute can resolve any old disagreement. For example, the subject matter of
the disagreement needs to be relevant to the dispute in order for the dispute to be
substantive;  disagreement  over  who to  vote  for  at  the  next  election would be
unlikely to be solved by arguing over how to cook brisket for. This point is pretty
much in accordance with Jenkins's account, but  I would go further and say that a
dispute should also arise in virtue of  the right kind of  disagreement. It is hard to
imagine cases where two people disagree over some proposition P, argue over its
truth it, but that their dispute does not arise in virtue of  it. We need to posit some
mechanism by which the disputants can disagree over the subject matter of  the
dispute, without their disagreement coming into play. This verges on the absurd.
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It is almost incomprehensible that two people could argue over the truth of  “P”
whilst  disagreeing  over  the  truth  of  P,  without  letting  those  beliefs  affect  the
dispute.  Likewise,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  whether disputes  like the  one between
Sheila and Jeff  are really coherent. However, let's allow for a moment that the
case of  Sheila and Jeff  does make sense. I argue that even if  it does, it would still
not  be  a  substantive  dispute;  that  is,  not  until  Shelia  and  Jeff's  first  order
disagreement kicks in, but then it would either be a different dispute, or would
not be wholly explained by their linguistic divergence from one another.
We can see this from the arguments that they would sincerely employ in
support  for their  positions.  Let's  say they only employ arguments which arise
from their linguistic divergence. Jeff  may say something like “There is beer in the
fridge, I bought some yesterday” and Sheila may say “But you didn't buy beer, as
you only buy cheap lager” in reply. In this case, their dispute looks very much like
a verbal dispute. They are for all practical purposes speaking past one another, as
they both are using different criteria for beer being in the fridge, and the situation
which Jeff  takes to be the case—cheap lager being in the fridge—would meet
Jeff's criteria, but not Sheila's.
However,  if  they  use  arguments  which  spring  from  their  substantive
disagreement, then their dispute will fail to operate as a merely verbal dispute. If
Sheila instead replies to Jeff  with “Well I went to the fridge to nab a yogurt some
time  ago  but  I  saw  it  was  completely  empty”  then  she  will  have  expressed
something  incompatible  with  what  Jeff  believes,  but  not  as  a  result  of  their
linguistic divergence. 
In this case, the dispute changes from being merely verbal to there being
something substantive at issue, namely, whether there is anything at all  in the
fridge. Of  course, there is still the confusion over whether there is 'beer' in the
fridge,  but  there  would  be  some  substantive  disagreement  underlying  in  the
dispute. In this case, their dispute is only partly verbal, rather than merely verbal.
We can see in the case of  Sheila and Jeff, that they do disagree about relevant
matters, but their dispute is in no way grounded by this disagreement; it arises
from something other than the actual disagreement. I take it that this case, if  the
disputants  didn't  let  their  actual  disagreement  come  into  play,  then  it  would
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remain a verbal dispute. If  they did let it come into play, then it would cease to be
a verbal dispute.
What  I  have tried  to  do in  this  section is  to  explain why Chalmers  is
correct in taking it that it is relevant to whether we have a verbal dispute, whether
or not it arises from the linguistic differences of  the disputants or not. This is
opposed to Jenkins, who holds that whether we have a verbal dispute is more to
do with what the disputants disagree on, rather than whether or not the dispute
arises in virtue of  such disagreement.
Conclusion
I have pointed out some problems with Chalmers's account of  verbal disputes,
and suggested some amendments. I have also defended what I take to be a key
insight  of  Chalmers's  definition:  that  verbal  disputes  are  those  which arise in
virtue  of  linguistic  divergence.  All  things  considered,  this  is  the  definition  of
verbal disputes which I favour:
A dispute over S is broadly verbal when, for some expression T in S, the parties
use (or are disposed to use) T in different ways, and the dispute over S arises
wholly in virtue of  this divergence in the usage of  (or the disposal to use) T.
This  gets  over  the  problem  of  the  disputants  not  having  any  particular
metalinguistic  beliefs,  and  it  is  easily  targeted  at  merely  verbal  disputes  by
specifying that the disputants intend to be speaking about some first order subject






Conceptual  analysis  is  usually  taken  to  be  the  practice  of  spelling  out  the
application conditions for our concepts, or in other words: finding out when it is
correct to apply a particular concept. It is, as Jackson points out, essential for the
project  of  conceiving  of  the  world  in  a  limited  amount  of  more  or  less
fundamental ingredients. If  we can completely describe the Xs in terms of  a more
fundamental vocabulary then we need not posit a separate ontological category
for them; they would be nothing over and above matters described in the more
fundamental vocabulary. This seems to give us a framework allows us to solve
certain  philosophical  problems.  If  we  can  show that  the  existence  of  Xs  are
entailed by matters  described in a certain  way then,  if  we can show that  the
description is  true,  we  have secured  the  existence  of  Xs.  Conceptual  analysis
would  be  necessary  for  doing  this  for  Jackson  because  it  is,  at  its  heart,
“addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one
told  in  an  allegedly  more  fundamental  vocabulary”  (1998:  28).  This  Chapter
addresses Williamson’s inductive argument against conceptual analysis, and what
I  call  the  'deflationary  argument',  which  entails  that  engaging  in  conceptual
analysis is pointless in a similar way to engaging in verbal disputes. I argue that
this criticism only works against a particular type of  conceptual analysis, and that
another type, specifically Carnapian explication, can certainly escape it. In this
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way the argument would not be fatal to conceptual analysis in general, only a
particular form of  it.  
With  regards  to  metaphysics,  most  commentators  have  focussed  on
Carnap’s  overall  deflationary  project.  However,  his  notion  of  explication  is
something that we can take on without committing to Carnap’s overall project.
This is what I intend to do by showing that Carnapian explication can help us
with questions of  ontological reduction. I first outline some contemporary views
on conceptual analysis, most importantly Frank Jackson’s ‘Canberra plan’ style. I
then  outline  Williamson's  argument  against  conceptual  analysis  and  how  it
affects the Canberra plan as conceived by Jackson. I will  do the same for the
deflationary  argument  against  conceptual  analysis.  I  then  outline  Carnapian
explication  and  how  it  helps  overcome  both  arguments  against  conceptual
analysis.  Finally  I  address  certain  responses  that  could  be  used  against  my
proposal. 
Conceptual analysis and the Canberra plan
What is conceptual analysis? In order to give an adequate characterisation it will
be useful to give some historical background. It is taken by most philosophers
that there exist complex concepts, i.e. ones with structure (Margolis and Laurence,
1999:  4-5).  Some  may  take  complex  concepts  to  be  composed  of  other,
supposedly  more  fundamental  concepts.  For  example  the  concept  JOEY  is
composed of  the concepts MARSUPIAL and INFANT. Because, on one sense of
the word, analysis is decomposition i.e. the breaking down of  something into its
simpler,  more  fundamental  parts,  conceptual  analysis  is  frequently  defined as
finding out what the fundamental components of  our concepts are. In this way,
by finding out how our complex concepts are composed, we would presumably
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gain a greater understanding of  them. It is then easy to see why philosophers12
have characterised conceptual analysis as this:
CA1: The decomposition of  our concepts  into their  more fundamental
components
This characterisation would be inadequate (for our purposes of  broadly defining
conceptual analysis) if  we took it as literal, as it both assumes a restrictive view of
conceptual structure and of  analysis. Regarding conceptual structure, it rules out
Inferentialism, which Laurence and Margolis describe thus: 
According to this view, one concept is a structured complex of  other concepts
just in case it stands in a privileged relation to these other concepts, generally, by
way of  some type of  inferential disposition (1999: 5).
Regarding  analysis,  CA1 taken  literally  rules  out  what  Michael  Beaney  calls
transformative analysis. In describing it he says:
Fundamental  to  the  [Russell's  theory  of  descriptions]  is  the  rephrasing of  the
sentence to be analysed . . . There is nothing decompositional about this type of
analysis (2007: 2-3).
In  this  way,  following  Quine  (1959:  20-1)  and  Rey  (2012),  we  should  view
‘decomposition’—and  the  containment  model  of  concepts  it  implies—as
metaphorical. Even as a metaphor I would say that it is too restrictive (for reasons
that  I  give  later  on  in  the  essay).  A  broader  and  better  characterisation  of
conceptual  analysis  would  be  one  that  presupposes  as  little  about  the  actual
structure of  our concepts as possible (or even if  they have structure at all!):
CA2:  The  process  of  specifying  the  application  conditions  for  our
concepts in a non-trivial way13
One of  the more recent schools of  conceptual analysis that would fall under this
12        To take one example: “It seems necessary, then, to regard the world as formed of  concepts.
These are the only objects of  knowledge. They cannot be regarded fundamentally as abstractions 
either from things or from ideas; since both alike can, if  anything is to be true of  them, be 
composed of  nothing but concepts. A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its 
constituent concepts” (Moore, 1889: 9).
13      I say “in a non-trivial way” because, for instance, the application conditions for the concept 
BELIEF could be spelled out trivially as: “x is a belief  iff  x is a belief ”. 
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characterisation is known colloquially as the ‘Canberra plan’. It draws primarily
from the work of  David Lewis and Frank Jackson. (Despite the introduction I
just  gave  to  conceptual  analysis  and  also  the  name  itself,  Frank  Jackson’s
treatment  of  conceptual  analysis  does  not  include  much  discussion  about
concepts themselves. He instead says “our subject is really the elucidation of  the
possible situations covered by the words we use to ask our questions” (1998: 33).
This does not matter for us so much at this point but note that it is odd for the
foremost  contemporary  champion  of  conceptual  analysis  to  have  so  little
discussion  about  the  nature  of  concepts.)  Jackson  characterises  conceptual
analysis as finding out whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one
told in another “more fundamental vocabulary” (1998: 28). This characterisation
relates  to CA1. So that  the  story  told in the  “more fundamental  vocabulary”
would be told with the concepts which supposedly compose the concepts used in
the original story. It is also similar to Brandom’s remark that analytic philosophy
has  at  its  heart  “a  concern  with  semantic  relations  between  what  I  will  call
‘vocabularies’ . . . Its characteristic form of  question is whether and in what way
one can make sense of  the meanings expressed by one kind of  locution in terms
of  the  meanings  expressed  by  another  kind  of  locution”  (2008:  1).  Jackson’s
conception of  analysis has a much more reductive flavour than this as we shall
see. It connects with CA2 in that the application conditions for a concept would
be the concept spelled out in the more fundamental vocabulary. Some points that
set apart the Canberra plan from other forms of  conceptual analysis is (1) its
formulations of  various philosophical problems and the solutions it offers, and (2)
the importance it gives to folk theory14. By 'the folk theory of  X', I mean roughly
the ordinary conception of  X. Frank Jackson takes it that the folk theory is an
“amalgam of  individual [conceptions]” (1998: 32n). He states: “To the extent that
our  intuitions  coincide,  they  reveal  our  shared  theory.  To the  extent  that  our
intuitions coincide with those of  the folk, they reveal the folk theory” (1998: 32).
Concerning (1) the Canberra planner takes many philosophical problems
to have a similar form, i.e. a question regarding where (if  they are located at all)
the so-and-sos are located in such-and-such a description of  the world. These are
14 From this point on, when talking about the Canberra plan, I will primarily be talking about 
Jackson's view, unless where specified.
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called by Jackson location problems (1998: 4). It is not immediately obvious where,
for example, ethical properties, colours, beliefs, etc. are contained within such a
description of  the world. The practice of  solving these sorts of  problems is what
Jackson calls serious-metaphysics. Jackson’s method for solving location problems is
by showing how the things-to-be-located are entailed jointly by a definition of
that  thing  and  a  description  of  the  world  in  a  certain  more  fundamental
vocabulary,  one  that  effectively  shows  the  conditions  for  the  definition  being
instantiated  are  met  (1998:  4-5).  Consider  joeys.  ‘Being  a  joey’  is  a  different
property each from ‘being an infant’ and ‘being a marsupial’. However, we can
see that  being a joey is nothing over and above the conjunction of  these two
properties.  If  there  is  a  true  description  of  the  world  which  specifies  infant
marsupials then that description entails the existence of  joeys, by virtue of  our
definition of  joey (in fact Jackson states that being entailed by an account is a
necessary condition for having a place in an account (1998: 5)). In this way we
need not posit any separate ontological category for joeys over and above infants
and marsupials. 
Jackson characterises  serious  metaphysics  as  trying  to  comprehend the
world in a limited number of  more or less basic notions. By doing this we are not
merely  drawing  up  a  list  of  the  things  that  exist  and  positing  a  separate
ontological category for each. As our example illustrates, we need not posit a
separate ontological category for everything that exists because some things exist
in virtue of  other ontological categories; they are ‘nothing over and above’ certain
other things. A more philosophically stimulating example could be finding out
whether the concept BELIEF (a term from our folk psychological vocabulary)
has a realizer in the language of  (a mature) cognitive science. If  our statements
about  beliefs  were  not  made  true  by  any  description  in  a  more  fundamental
vocabulary then we would have to take beliefs as primitive or be eliminative about
beliefs as traditionally conceived (1998: 4). 
It  is  quite easy to see the connection between serious metaphysics  and
conceptual analysis thus characterised. We characterised conceptual analysis as
the process of  specifying the application conditions for our concepts in another
more fundamental vocabulary. In this sense if  we have application conditions for
a concept told in a more fundamental vocabulary, we can reduce the concept to
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the story told in said vocabulary, so the former is nothing over and above the
latter. Let’s say the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a joey take this
form:
x is a joey iff  x is an infant and x is a marsupial
Because the left hand side of  the biconditional is truth conditionally equivalent
(by definition no less) to the right hand side we can effectively reduce the left
hand side to the right hand side. There is no way that something could be a joey
without also being an infant and a marsupial. Likewise, if  something is an infant
marsupial then by definition it is a joey. The realization of  a complex concept
may be nothing over and above the things specified in the application conditions.
In fact the realization of  the application conditions would, according to Jackson,
entail that the concept is realized. This form of  analysis is called reductive analysis.
It differs from other forms of  analysis in that it seeks to reduce certain categories
to  other  more  fundamental  ones,  rather  than,  for  example,  show  their
interconnections (Strawson, 1992: 19-21). 
However  there  are  other  connections  between serious  metaphysics  and
conceptual analysis, hence (2). Jackson sees serious metaphysics as committed to
some  form  of  conceptual  analysis  because  in  order  to  perform  serious
metaphysics we need to ‘define our subject’. This defining the subject forms a key
part of  this style of  conceptual analysis, and hence forms the first part of  Daniel
Nolan’s two-steps to Canberra plan analysis (Nolan, 2009): 
(a) We  define  the  subject  by  gathering  our  platitudes  about  the  Xs  and
regimenting them so that we have a neat theoretical role the X plays.
(b) We look in the world for something that plays this theoretical role; we find
out whether our description of  the Xs is made true by a description in a more
fundamental vocabulary.  
So why is defining the subject so important? When we investigate whether Xs
exist and in what manner they may exist we are, in a sense, obliged to operate
with a certain conception of  Xs, i.e. the one that a relevant group operates with.
The term Jackson uses for the relevant group is the folk. This does not necessarily
mean we need to know the man on the street’s conception of  ‘X’; he may not
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possess the concept of  X to the required degree. Furthermore, the man on the
street  most  likely  does  not  have  concepts  of  neutrons,  of  rhizomes,  or  of
infinitesimals. These are scientific concepts; the ordinary conception is the one
that that people working in the relevant field operate with. So in this sense, when
analysing scientific concepts the ‘folk’  are simply those people working in the
relevant field, or who are familiar with the literature. Sometimes the folk are the
folk  in  the  ordinary  sense,  as  is  the  case  when we analyse  the  terms  of  folk
psychology. We all partake in the practice of  positing mental states; we all mostly
follow the rules of  folk psychology, so we are all part of  the relevant group (1998:
30-31)15. 
But why are we obliged to operate with the folk conception of  Xs? Well if
we  deviate  from the  ordinary  conception  then  we  have  changed  the  subject.
According to Jackson, this is not good at all, because when we ask whether or not
beliefs  exist  we  do  not  ask  whether  beliefs  according  to  some  philosopher’s
definition exist. As Jackson states “If  I say what I mean – never mind what others
mean – by ‘belief ’ is any information-carrying state that causes subjects to utter
sentences like ‘I believe that snow is white’, the existence of  beliefs so conceived
will  be  safe  from  the  eliminativists’  arguments”,  but  then  “I  have  turned
interesting  philosophical  debates  into  easy  exercises  in  deductions  from
stipulative definitions together with accepted facts” (ibid).
So how would we define our subject? The way that Jackson and Lewis
recommend is to gather our platitudes concerning the Xs and conjoin them into a
sentence (Braddon-Mitchell and Nola, 2009: 2-7). This sentence’s job would be to
capture our folk theory of  the Xs. It would then provide the Xs with a theoretical
role, which would make it easier to see if  something in the world played said
theoretical role and hence could be regarded as an X. Part of  defining the subject
would consist in reflection on possible cases. Our conjunction of  platitudes may
align with folk intuitions about actual  cases and yet radically differ in how it
classifies possible cases. If  this were the case with our conjunction of  platitudes
then it would not have adequately captured our folk theory of  the Xs. There are
15     In this chapter I make use of  the term ‘folk-concept’. Philosophers usually would just call the 
former a ‘concept’; however, later on I make use of  more unnatural concepts so my use of  the 
former term is just to help distinguish natural concepts from concepts in general.  
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some issues with this that need to be addressed:
(i) How would we organise the platitudes into a theory and how do we represent
the theoretical role for the Xs?
(ii) How would we ensure that in both vocabularies we are describing the same
thing?
The  typical  Canberra  planner’s  response  to  these  issues  is  to  appeal  to  the
Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis treatment of  theoretical terms. Lewis in his paper How to
Define Theoretical Terms (1970) seems to only consider scientific theories; however
he later applies the same treatment of  theoretical terms to folk psychology (1972).
As we have said: conceptual analysis is the very business of  finding out
whether something in one vocabulary is made true by a description in a more
fundamental vocabulary. But how do we decide what vocabulary counts as the
fundamental  one? Ramsey (or perhaps  Lewis’s interpretation of  Ramsey),  as
well as helping us define our terms, gives us a suitable framework for doing this.
Ramsey  introduces  the  notions  of  ‘primary’  and  ‘secondary’  systems.  The
primary  system consists  of  all  the  terms  and  propositions  in  the  universe  in
question,  these  constitute  “the  facts  to  be  explained”.  The  secondary  system
would be symbols that stand for propositional functions of  a theoretical language
(these  would just  be  terms and predicates in the  theoretical  language (Psillos,
1999:  51)).  Now16,  following Lewis,  we can interpret  the secondary system as
consisting of  theoretical terms or T-terms, and the primary system as O-terms.
Philosophers have interpreted the O-terms in different ways. For example, Carnap
takes the O-terms to be observational terms; ones that refer to sense data. Lewis
takes  the  O-terms  to  be  old  terms,  or  original  terms;  ones  that  we  already
understood.  My  use  of  O-terms  will  be  closer  to  Lewis’s,  with  some  slight
modifications. Lewis applies his method mainly to scientific theories, so T-terms
would be theoretical entities such as electrons or quarks. This is why he states
that  the  original  terms  must  have  been  understood  before  we  introduced  the
theory. However I am not limiting this method to science. ‘Knowledge’ may have
been a term that was introduced before ‘belief ’ was chronologically, however that
does not stop us from analysing knowledge in terms of  belief  in the way that
16            The following discussion draws heavily from Lewis (1970, 1972).
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Ayer does. Another way in which Lewis’s treatment of  theoretical terms differs
from my own is that Lewis views all of  the relations between the entities denoted
by the O-terms and T-terms as causal. I follow Jackson in not holding to this. In
this  case  the  fundamental  vocabulary  is  the  one  that  we  can  analyse  the
theoretical terms in, i.e. the one we already understand (the O-terms). For my
purposes here, however, it would not suffice to give a definition of  a term merely
in a vocabulary that we already understand. For a reductive analysis the term
must be defined in an ontologically more fundamental vocabulary. I would then
add that in order for our Ramsey sentence (I will explain what that is soon) to aid
in  reduction,  we  would  need  the  O-terms  to  be  in  an  ontologically  more
fundamental vocabulary than the T-terms.
Let’s say we want to reduce KNOWLEDGE to a description in a more
fundamental vocabulary. First we should gather the platitudes that the folk hold
about knowledge. 
S knows that P only if  they believe P
S knows that P only if  P is true
S knows that P only if  they are justified in believing that P
Now let’s  say that  we understand the terms ‘belief ’,  ‘true’,  and ‘justification’.
These will then be our O-terms; the ones that we understand already. Our T-term
is the term we are attempting to define, so in this case it is ‘knowledge’. We can
conjoin  these  platitudes  into  a  theoretical  postulate  of  T,  where  T  is  an
approximation of  the folk theory of  knowledge:
T [knowledge is a relation to a proposition P that S stands in when S has a
justified true belief  that P]
If  we replace the T-terms with variables then we have the realization formula of
T:
T [x is a relation to a proposition P that S stands in when S has a justified
true belief  that P]
If  the realization formula of  T is satisfied by some entities, i.e. if  the description
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of  the variables is satisfied, then we can say that the theory T is realized. If  we
existentially quantify the realization formula we have the Ramsey sentence of  T:
∃x T [x is a relation to a proposition P that S stands in when S has a
justified true belief  that P]
The Ramsey sentence of  T effectively says that there is some entity or set of
entities  that  satisfies  the  realization  formula  of  T.  So  this  Ramsey  sentences
effectively says there are justified true beliefs. And barring global scepticism this is
true, for we have many cases of  justified true belief  in everyday life. 
Now surely (if  we can also provide an analysis of  justification, truth, and
belief  that  allows for  it,  and barring  a  global  sceptical  hypothesis)  under  this
definition we can say that people have knowledge, for we do have justified true
beliefs.  However,  part  of  defining  the  subject  (and  hence  deciding  if  we  are
operating  with  the  right  definition)  is  considering  whether  possible  cases  of
justified true belief  would intuitively count as knowledge. As it turns out there are
possible cases of  justified true belief  which do not count as knowledge, i.e. cases
of  epistemic  luck,  most  notably  ‘Gettier  cases’.  Because  we would not  count
these  cases  of  justified  true  belief  as  knowledge,  by  reducing  knowledge  to
justified true belief, we have not adequately defined the subject. If  our analysis of
a concept is supposed to represent the folk theory of  the concept as best as we
can, then if  there are cases where it conflicts with the folk theory then there is a
problem with our analysis (Jackson, 1998: 31-4). 
Very plausibly there could be something wrong with our analysis of  the
folk theory, just as there are problems with the JTB account of  knowledge. But
another possibility is that there could be a problem with the folk theory itself. For
example, there could be platitudes that are inconsistent together17, the platitudes
just  don’t  describe  the  world  accurately,  or  perhaps  the  platitudes  only  cover
everyday situations. In these cases the theory is inadequate. However, does this
mean  that  we  should  be  eliminativists  about  the  concept  in  question?  Not
according to Jackson. For him if  we define our concept close enough to the folk’s
conception  “to  be  regarded  as  a  natural  extension  of  it,  and which does  the
17   Weatherson (2003: 24-5) argues that our platitudes regarding knowledge may be inconsistent.
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theoretical  job  the  folk  give  to  [the  concept]”  (1998:  44-5)  then  we  have
successfully defined the subject, regardless of  whether we have to shave bits off  or
add bits on to the theory. In certain cases the theoretical job a concept is supposed
to perform can presumably be performed by a number of  different variations of
that concept. 
Jackson draws a parallel between this and Quine’s notion of  paraphrasing
(ibid). For Quine, we paraphrase a sentence of  ordinary language by interpreting
it into a more logical vocabulary. When we do this we do not aim at synonymy,
instead we may, for example, aim at simplicity, or the reduction of  ambiguity.
Quine  states  that  although  the  sentence  and  its  paraphrase  may  be  used
synonymously, that isn’t to say that they are synonymous; the most we can say
here is that both sentences perform the same purpose for the speaker (1960: §46).
Now the connection with Jackson’s account is that in interpreting the folk theory
we may not necessarily aim at synonymy either. Our folk concepts play some
theoretical role, to use Jackson’s example, our concept of  personal identity plays
the role of  governing our personal relations, our social institutions of  reward and
punishment,  etc.  Although  our  folk  conception  of  personal  identity  may  be
Dualist in nature, it need not be in order for it to prevent questions like this from
arising: “Why should I pay that debt from five years ago? I was a completely
different person back then!” So, to run with Jackson’s example, if  we want to
analyse our concept of  personal identity we should try and stay faithful to the
folk theory of  it, but also we should look at the role that the concept plays in the
folk theory. If  that theory turns out to be false, or even if  it clashes with our prior
commitments  (in  this  case  physicalism),  we  may  still  be  able  to  show  that
something can occupy the theoretical role (1998: 44-5).
This picture of  conceptual analysis is inadequate as I shall show in the
next section.  I take the Canberra plan—as exemplified by the work of  Jackson
and  by  Nolan's  two-step—to  be  primarily  descriptive.  However,  Canberra
planners may be much more receptive to conceptual revision than I suggest. In
that  case,  I  would  say  I  am arguing  against  a  particular  kind  of  descriptive
analysis. This, I think, would be an important view in the vicinity. Nevertheless, I
think there is much textual support for taking Canberra planners to be engaging
in a heavily descriptive exercise. For instance, Jackson places a lot of  emphasis on
71
our  intuitions  about  possible  cases.  He  says  of  William  Lycan's  account  of
beliefs:
I of  course hold against Lycan that if  we give up too many of  the properties
common sense associates with belief  as represented by the folk theory of  belief,
we do indeed change the subject, and are no longer talking about belief. The role
of  the  intuitions  about  possible  cases  so  distinctive  of  conceptual  analysis  is
precisely to make explicit  our implicit  folk theory and, in particular,  to make
explicit  which  properties  are  really  central  to  some  state's  being  correctly
described as a belief. (1998: 38)
This is good evidence for Jackson taking conceptual analysis to be descriptive in
nature.  Sure,  he  allows  some  room  for  interpretation,  but  it  seems  that,  for
Jackson, one cannot  move away from what is central to the folk concept. 
Problems for conceptual analysis
In  this  section  I  will  outline  a  problem  for  Jackson’s  version  of  conceptual
analysis, from Timothy Williamson. Williamson casts doubt on the prospects for
finding an exact definition by way of  an inductive argument; philosophers have
been trying to provide analyses of  concepts for years with no real success, so why
should we trust this method at all?
Williamson and the inductive argument
Williamson argues that we have no reason to accept that we can provide a non-
trivial  analysis  of  most  concepts.  Williamson’s  argument  is  primary  directed
towards analyses of  KNOWLEDGE. However he generalises his  argument to
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other concepts: “Attempts to analyse the concepts means and causes, for example,
have  been  no  more  successful  than  attempts  to  analyse  the  concept  knows,
succumbing  to  the  same  pattern  of  counterexamples  and  epicycles”  (2000:
31).What constitutes a non-trivial18 analysis for Williamson is a conjunction of
other concepts that somehow jointly specify necessary and sufficient conditions.
Williamson does also talk about conceptual identity as a criterion for the correct
analysis  of  a concept.  For  instance,  he says  that  KNOWLEDGE is  a mental
concept, and so a non-mental19 concept like JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF—which
involves  non-mental  constituents—would  necessarily  be  distinct  from  it.  This
aspect  of  Williamson's  argument  I  will  not  address,  partly  because—jumping
ahead slightly—my solution to the inductive argument relies  on philosophical
analysis not being bound by the analysis being identical to the concept analysed.
Furthermore, stating correct application conditions for a concept, regardless of
conceptual  identity,  would  at  the  very  least  be  an  interesting.  Williamson's
argument  that  one  cannot  find  the  application  conditions  for  the  concept  of
knowledge partly comes from his thought that one cannot find an identical non-
mental concept:
The present account does not strictly entail that no analysis of  the traditional
kind provides correct necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing. But once
we  accept  that  the  concept  knows  is not  a  complex  concept  of  the  kind
traditionally envisaged, what reason have we to expect any such complex concept
even to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing? (2000: 30).
In  this  way  we  can  merely  take  this  criterion  as  support  for  the  inductive
argument, rather than being essential to it. So henceforth I will take Williamson's
point to be that we cannot articulate necessary and sufficient conditions for most
concepts, and I will not put much emphasis on conceptual identity20.
18      Though not necessarily a correct analysis.
19 So he argues (2000: 27-31)
20             Cassam, identifies two strands of  argument in the relevant passages from Williamson 
alongside that already stated. One is the distinct concepts argument; another is the false 
expectations argument. The first concerns concept identity, the second concerns us not expecting 
an analysis of  knowledge because no other interesting philosophical concepts has been analysed 
in the way we want. These seem quite restricted to Williamson’s treatment, of  knowledge, so they 
won’t be directly relevant to my discussion of  concepts in general. However I will assimilate the 
false expectations argument with the inductive argument (2009: 12). 
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One part of  Williamson’s argument for this point is based on the history
of  conceptual  analysis  being  a  history  of  failure.  Usually  whenever  someone
offers an analysis of  a concept, a counterexample to that analysis is produced.
And this supposedly has been the case in epistemology for some time21.  Ever
since Gettier proposed a counterexample to the ‘justified true belief ’ account of
knowledge ever more complex analyses of  knowledge have appeared with ever
more complex counterexamples soon following. Williamson inductively reasons
that because we have not so far been able to successfully analyse knowledge in
terms of  linguistic descriptions, we would have little reason to think that it would
be  possible  to  do  so.  Williamson  says  that  this  is  not  only  the  case  in
epistemology  but  also  throughout  philosophy:  “Not  all  concepts  have  such
analyses [in terms of  more basic notions] . . . the history of  analytic philosophy
suggests that those of  most philosophical interest do not” (2000: 31). 
Of  course Williamson’s evidence may only show that it is very hard to
analyse a concept and that the road to an adequate analysis of  a concept is long,
and paved with counterexamples. But without an example of  such an analysis we
would not have much evidence at all to support this suggestion.
Jackson has a response to Williamson’s argument. He says that the world
is huge, complex and we make sense of  it through similarity regions. Conceptual
analysis is trying to capture the same similarity region in two different ways, e.g.
the  region  picked  out  by  'joey'  is  the  same  as  the  one  picked  out  by  'infant
marsupials’.  These  patterns  would  constitute  the  application  conditions  for
JOEY. Jackson holds that it should be no surprise that conceptual analysis is hard
because there is no reason to think "it should it be obvious that different sets of
ingredients  put  together  in  appropriately  different  ways  carve  out  the  same
region"  (2005:  132).  Of  course  this  shows  why  conceptual  analysis  is  hard;
however,  it  does not  give us any reason to think that it  is  possible.  What the
conceptual  analyst  would  ideally  want  in  a  response  to  Williamson  is
reassurance that their method is worth pursuing. If  Jackson is right in saying that
conceptual analysis is hard, then perhaps it would not be too much of  a stretch
21           I myself  think that the success of  the counterexamples is overstated. Sure, potential 
counterexamples have been offered for every well-known analysis of  knowledge but as the 
analyses become more refined the counterexamples get more outlandish. 
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for it to be too hard; that is, too hard for us to ever reach a successful analysis of  a
concept.
However, another part of  Jackson's response to Williamson is intriguing,
and I believe contains the seed to a response to Williamson. Jackson holds that
the  reason  there  seems  to  be  so  much  disagreement  over  what  counts  as
knowledge (i.e. why it seems like we cannot have a successful analysis because of
counterexamples) is that there is not a single fixed pattern across the space of
possibilities  that  picks  out  ‘knowledge’.  Instead  there  are  many  candidate
patterns: Justified true belief, process reliablism, Nozickian sensitivity, etc. and
“for each candidate concept there is an analysis” (2005: 135). In most cases it
does not matter what one of  these we operate with; they all give the same results
in everyday life.  This is how Jackson allows for an analysis of  KNOWLEDGE.
His response is to say that we can analyse a concept like knowledge; different
philosophers have different concepts that they call knowledge, and they can all
provide an analysis of  knowledge according to their own concept. 
This  response  is  intriguing  because  of  his  emphasis  on  defining  the
subject. Jackson’s style of  doing conceptual analysis, as I interpret it, seems to
primarily aim at capturing the folk theory. When we try and capture the folk
theory we do not want to analyse some philosopher's concept of  knowledge; we
want  to  analyse  knowledge  insofar  as  individual’s  conceptions  of  knowledge
overlap (1998: 31-3). If  there is only a significant overlap over our classification
of  everyday cases then I assume Jackson would identify that overlap with the folk
theory: “to the extent that our intuitions coincide, they reveal our folk theory”
(ibid).  That  way,  as  the  different  philosopher’s  analyses  are  co-extensive  with
regard to everyday cases, the different philosophers would just be filling in the
blanks of  the folk theory. In this way their analyses can be seen as an extension of
the folk theory. 
However,  although  Jackson  may  be  right  in  saying  that  different
philosophers have different conceptions of  what counts as knowledge, this does
not entail that they each have different concepts of  knowledge. Two people may
have  different  opinions  on  what  counts  as  an  X without  operating  with  two
different concepts of  X. Consider Williamson’s example: “someone who relies on
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The Guardian in categorising politicians as ‘trustworthy’ or ‘untrustworthy’ is
categorising in a different way from someone who relies on The Daily Telegraph,
but it does not follow that they mean different things by the word ‘trustworthy’”
(2009:  130).  This  is  equally  applicable  in  the  philosophy  room:  When
epistemologists get around the table and throw counterexamples at one another
they do not respond by commenting “well that is not a counterexample to  my
analysis,  because  for  me  knowledge  is  just  XYZ”.  When  epistemologists  are
offered such counterexamples they feel obliged to address them in some other
way than just biting the bullet and saying that,  for example,  Gettier cases are
actually cases of  knowledge. There seems to be some kind of  shared concep we
are aiming at (I later examine where the power behind these counterexamples
comes from). 
Jackson’s  response  should  also  show  why  counterexamples  to  certain
proposed  analyses  of  knowledge  seem so  decisive.  For  example  justified  true
belief  does not seem as good as the less fluky true belief  reached by a reliable
method, no doubt because of  the power of  Gettier cases. He gives us two (non-
mutually exclusive) possibilities of  where the power of  counterexamples comes
from: 
(1)  Counterexamples show that our analysis is flawed because it shows that our
folk concept is not captured by the analysis
(2) Counterexamples Show that our analysis is flawed because although we may
have succeeded in analysing the concept we operate with (this may or may
not be the concept most of  us operate with); the concept we operate with is
inferior  to  another  concept  that  is  useful  for  the  purposes  we  want  the
original concept for. 
We  can  call  instances  of  the  first type-1  counterexamples  and  instances  of  the
second type-2 counterexamples. In the first instance his response to Williamson may
not work. If  his purpose is to capture the folk theory of  a concept, and he is
presented  with  good  type-1  counterexamples,  then  it  seems  that  he  has  not
adequately captured the folk theory; there would be more to the folk theory than
the everyday cases, otherwise where would the counterexamples of  type-1 come
from? In the second instance I would say that he escapes Williamson’s criticism;
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but only if  there were no good type-1 counterexamples. If  his aim is to capture
the folk theory and there is a counterexample of  the type-2 variety, then we have
shown a problem with the folk theory, not with his analysis. 
However, although the Gettier cases are certainly type-2 counterexamples
to the JTB account of  knowledge (as they show theoretical defects of  JTB), there
are good reasons to think they are type-1 counterexamples too. I take it that type-
1 counterexamples take their power from our intuitions about possible cases. This
is because the type-1 counterexamples would come from our understanding of
the concept at hand. Intuitions also seem to be where the Gettier cases get their
potency, so this is one feature Gettier cases would share with paradigm type-1s.
Of  course,  type-2  counterexamples  may also  get  some of  their  strength  from
intuitions,  for instance we might have intuitions of  theoretical  virtues such as
simplicity,  exactness,  etc.  Nevertheless,  I  would  say  Gettier  cases  are  type-1s
because  of  the  way  we  invoke  the  intuitions.  We do  not  generally  say  “The
Gettier cases show that the JTB account of  knowledge is flawed because they are
cases which do not feature the non-flukiness which we would want knowledge to
have” (although we could); we instead say something along the lines of  “The
Gettier cases show that the JTB account of  knowledge is flawed, because in them
people  have  justified  true  beliefs  without  having  knowledge”.  This  at  least
muddies  the  water,  so  that  it  is  entirely  possible—in  fact  likely—that  the
counterexamples to the JTB theory have been type-1s, and so there would be a
problem with the analysis, and not the folk theory.
Conceptual analysis as a verbal enterprise
Another objection to conceptual analysis is that engaging in it is a merely verbal
pursuit,  so is at worst pointless.  (Some may insist  I use the word 'conceptual'
instead of  'verbal' here as we are talking about conceptual analysis, but both can
effectively  do  the  same  work  in  this  objection.  Certainly  in  some  cases,
77
conceptual differences may even be what lead people to verbally dispute.) Recall
that in the last chapter, we endorsed Chalmers's definition, or rather a variant
thereof, as our definition of  a verbal dispute. However, Chalmers holds that his
view of  verbal disputes is somewhat deflationary about Conceptual analysis. He
states:
This picture leads to a certain deflationism about the role of  conceptual analysis
(whether  a  priori  or  a  posteriori)  and about  the interest  of  questions  such as
“What is  X?” or “What is it to be  X ?” Some component of  these questions is
inevitably  verbal,  and  the  nonverbal  residue  can  be  found  without  using  ‘X’
(2011: ).
Conceptual analysis is at its most basic, finding the application conditions for our
concepts.  An  example  of  an  expression  is  found  in  this  remark  from  Frank
Jackson  which  I  quoted  earlier:  “conceptual  analysis  is  the  very  business  of
addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one
told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary” (1998: 28)22. The verbal
element concerns the application conditions which we attach to a  concept of
philosophical interest. There are often competing sets of  application conditions in
the vicinity, and the choice between these, the argument goes, would be a verbal
(or conceptual) one. Take one of  Chalmers's examples:
One  frequently  finds  verbal  elements  in  disputes  over  the  formulation  of
physicalism. For example, some physicalists hold that physicalism is the thesis
that  everything supervenes  on the properties  invoked by a  completed  physics
(whether or not they are mental), while others hold that physicalism is the thesis
that everything supervenes on the properties invoked by a completed physics and
that these properties are nonmental (2011: 533)
The verbal element in formulating physicalism then, is the question of  what the
application conditions for PHYSICALISM (or PHYSICAL) are.  But then the
merely verbal element is the conceptual analysis, or at least a large part of  it. As
we saw in the last chapter, verbal disputes are nonsubstantive and engaging in
them is  a  pointless  activity.  This,  the  possible  objection  goes,  should  lead  to
deflationism about conceptual analysis. 
22 These two characterisations are compatible. Whether one a story in one vocabulary is made 
true by another will depend upon the application conditions of  the terms in the first story. 
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As an aside, this is perhaps not the precise view of  Chalmers, for he does
see a place for conceptual analysis. 
The model  is  not  completely  deflationary  about  conceptual  analysis.  On this
model,  the  analysis  of  words  and  the  associated  concepts  is  relatively
unimportant in understanding a first-order domain. But it is still interesting and
important  to  analyze  conceptual  spaces:  the  spaces  of  concepts  (and  of  the
entities they pick out) that are relevant to a domain, determining which concepts
can play which roles, what the relevant dimensions of  variation are, and so on
(2011: 539).
But he is clear about what he sees as the limits of  conceptual analysis:
On the picture I favor, instead of  asking “What is X ?,” one should focus on the
roles one wants X to play and see what can play that role. The roles in question
here may in principle be properties of  all sorts: so one focuses on the properties
one wants X to have and figures out what has those properties (2011: 538).
[The  view  expressed  in  the  quote  before  last]  leads  naturally  to  a  sort  of
conceptual pluralism: there are multiple interesting concepts (corresponding to
multiple  interesting  roles)  in  the  vicinity  of  philosophical  terms  such  as
‘semantic’, ‘justified’, ‘free’, and not much of  substance depends on which one
goes with the term (2011: 529).
In this way, the question of  what the particular application conditions are of  a
concept  is  relatively  unimportant,  compared  to  the  question  of  what  sets  of
application conditions are in the vicinity and what roles they can play. However,
not everyone who accepts the idea that conceptual analysis is pointless in the
same way as verbal disputes are would accept Chalmers's conceptual pluralism,
so  I  will  not  include  these  qualification  of  Chalmers's  account  in  the  main
objection of  this section. The objection put to the Canberra planner then is that
conceptual analysis has the same feature that makes verbal disputes verbal, and
hence it may suffer from the same type of  pointlessness. 
The charge of  verbalness may have more specific negative consequences
for the Canberra plan. Consider the emphasis that the Canberra plan style puts
on folk-theory. As stated in the section “Conceptual analysis and the Canberra
Plan”, what the Canberra planner (ideally) does is gather our various platitudes
regarding some term 'X', combine them so we have a theoretical role for X, and
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then  sees  if  there  is  anything  that  plays  this  theoretical  role.  One  way  the
objection affects this style of  analysis regards the various ways we can interpret
the folk-theory. As our folk theory of  X mostly regards everyday situations, there
may  be  considerable  room  for  interpretation  in  our  analysis.  Jackson  states:
“What compatibilist arguments show, or so it seems to me, is not that free action
as understood by the folk is compatible with determinism, but that free action on
a conception near enough to the folk's to be regarded as a natural extension of  it,
and which does the theoretical job we folk give the concept of  free action” (1998:
44-5). The way an analysis would be a 'natural extension' of  the analysed concept
—as opposed to an unnatural extension of  it—would, I think, be in its catgorising
everyday examples in accordance with the ordinary conception. So perhaps there
are many natural extensions of  a particular folk-concept, and the choice between
these various analyses will be merely verbal.
 
Analysis and decomposition 
One thing all of  these criticisms have in common is a certain view of  analysis.
They all view analysis as aiming to capture a folk theory through our application
conditions for it. 
This I think expresses the  decompositional view, which entails analysis as
the breaking down of  a complex concept into its 'proper parts'. These proper parts
are would be other concepts. As stated in the section “Conceptual analysis and
the Canberra Plan”, decomposition can be taken as metaphorical: In this way a
complex concept would 'contain' other concepts in the sense that other concepts
would have to be instantiated in order for the complex concept to be instantiated.
Our concepts ‘containing’ other concepts would be nothing over and above the
other concepts featuring in their application conditions. We may think that JOEY
‘contains’  MARSUPIAL and  INFANT,  as  one  cannot  correctly  apply  JOEY
across  the  board  without  being  able  to  correctly  apply  MARSUPIAL  and
INFANT as  well,  as  JOEY would  be  the  intersection  of  MARSUPIAL and
80
INFANT. So,  if  we correctly apply  MARSUPIAL and INFANT to  the same
thing then that thing is a joey.
What is essential to decomposition is that we start off  with a more or less
exact  concept  to  analyse,  and  that  we  articulate  necessary  and  sufficient
conditions for its use. Even Jackson seems to have something close to this in mind
because of  his insistence on capturing the folk theory, or something suitably close
to it. Notice that on his way of  admitting that there can be many analyses of
KNOWLEDGE,  he  still  has  to  identify  each  concept  of  knowledge  with  a
particular person's 'theory' of  knowledge. 
Decomposition does not seem to exhaust the conceptions of  analysis. It
seems  that  certain  things  can  be  analysed  in  various  ways,  take  Michael
Dummett’s example of  a geographer carving up a country into different regions:
“One and the same country might be subdivided into regions in different ways for
different purposes—in terms of  geological structure, the kind of  terrain, types of
vegetation or climate, the languages, religions or cultures of  the inhabitants, etc.”
(1981:  263). This example does not really express the specific kind of  analysis I
outline and defend however. In this example we already have all the information
there ready to be decomposed, it is just a matter of  how we choose to do it. (Also
in this example we are not analysing a concept, rather a concrete object.) The
conception of  analysis I will defend later in the essay has a more amplitative feel.
Counterexamples
Counterexamples  are  important  to   Williamson’s  criticism.  Recall  Jackson’s
distinction between those counterexamples that show we have not captured the
folk  theory  (type-1),  and  those  that  show there  is  a  superior  concept  to  that
expressed  by  our  analysis  (type-2).  When  an  analysis  is  faced  with  a
counterexample it would be hard to tell which of  these categories, it falls into23. I
23            It certainly seems plausible that a counterexample could fall into both categories. 
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am quite sure that there are examples of  both types. An example of  the first type
is  the Gettier  case.  It  seems to be a  member of  the  first  type because  of  the
widespread agreement that it is a genuine counterexample to the JTB account of
knowledge.  This  counterexample  arose  from  testing  a  definition  against  our
intuitions about a possible case. Gettier cases count as counterexamples to the
JTB  account  of  knowledge  because  they  show  situations  where  a  proposed
definition and our intuitions disagree. I hold, as Jackson does, that our intuitions
about possible cases are a good guide to our folk theory (1998: 31-4). Hence, if
we have very strong intuitions about Gettier cases counting as knowledge then
JTB does not accord with our folk theory. The first type of  counterexample may
even connect with the second in certain cases; the counterexamples may come
from the same source. It may be that our folk-theory of  knowledge does not have
determinate application conditions written into it; rather it aims to exclude cases
of  epistemic luck for reasons of  knowledge being reliable. So a situation which
features epistemic luck may count as a type-1 counterexample because it conflicts
with the folk theory’s aim, i.e. it involves epistemic luck; but it may also be a type-
2  counterexample  because  the  folk  theory’s  aim may be  to  exclude  cases  of
epistemic  luck  without  explicitly  identifying  what  type  of  epistemic  luck  is
involved. In this case the folk theory may be dynamic; it may change depending
on the cases of  epistemic luck it becomes aware of. However it would retain the
same aim, i.e. excluding cases of  epistemic luck.
I  interpret  Williamson  as  focusing  on  type-1  counterexamples.  This  is
because they seem to be the only ones that are decisive in showing that a given
analysis  is  false  (if  of  course  our  primary purpose  is  to  spell  out  application
conditions  for  the  folk theory).  If  we are operating with our  folk  concept  of
knowledge, and it is part of  that concept that Gettier cases do not count as cases
of  knowledge then the conditional ‘if  K is knowledge then K is not a Gettier case’
would presumably be a priori; we could know it to be true by possession of  the
folk concept (Chalmers, 2012: 13). 
If  we  are  engaging  in  decompositional  analysis,  then  type-1
counterexamples  would  be  the  main  ones  we  would  have  to  watch  out  for.
However, if  the purpose of  our analysis is not to do this—if  it is ampliative—then
these counterexamples will not seem so powerful (what exactly the purpose of
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our analysis is we will look at in the next section). If  we see the folk theory as
merely giving our  analysis  a  starting point  then large  deviation from the  folk
theory may be acceptable. As stated, the primary purpose of  Jackson’s account
seems to be spelling out or approximating the application conditions for our folk
concepts as they are. He states: “[for example] what we are seeking to address
is . . . whether intentional states according to our ordinary conception, or something
suitably  close  to  our  ordinary conception,  will  survive what  cognitive  science
reveals about the operations of  our brains” (1998: 31). So a more ampliative view
of  analysis may allow for our analysis of  a concept to be quite far away from the
ordinary conception of  it, something that I doubt Jackson would allow for. What
constitutes something being suitably close to or unsuitably far from our ordinary
conception according to Jackson is a vague matter. However, recall that Jackson
says this: “What compatibilist arguments show, or so it seems to me, is not that
free action as understood by the folk is compatible with determinism, but that
free action on a conception near enough to the folk's to be regarded as a natural
extension of  it, and which does the theoretical job we folk give the concept of
free action” (1998: 44-5). This is permissible for Jackson as compatibilists show
that “a compatibilist substitute does all we legitimately require of  a concept of
free action”. So perhaps for Jackson changing the subject is permissible when the
analysis can be seen as a natural extension of  the folk concept, and it does the
theoretical work that the folk wish the concept to do. 
 I am not so sure that this would allow Jackson to make significantly large
revisions to a folk theory. He states that “it is, to one extent or another, vague as
to which concept we use the word ‘knowledge’ for, and in practice it often does
not matter—that which we are certain of  is very often that which we arrive at by
a reliable process and which is not true by accident” (2005: 135). These various
concepts all give similar results in everyday life with regards to our application of
the term ‘knowledge’; in this way they are all near-realisers of  the folk concept;
they fill in the theoretical space that the folk theory leaves empty. A far realiser
would perhaps be one that differs from the folk theory in classifying everyday
cases. An example of  conceptual revision (that I talk about in the next chapter)
that replaces a concept with a far realiser is perhaps Carnap’s example concept
FISH (which applies to all and only water dwelling animals) being replaced by
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the concept PISCES (which excludes whales, sea snails, etc.). This does not seem
to me to be a natural extension, nor a natural limitation of  the concept; it seems
to be an almost complete replacement. In the next section I shall outline a kind of
analysis that allows for large amounts of  revision
Carnap and explication 
Explication, in Carnap’s terms, is the “task of  making more exact a vague or not
quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of  scientific or
logical development, or rather of  replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact
concept”. The former concept is called the explicandum and the latter is called the
explicatum. The explicatum must have explicit rules for its use so we know when it
is correctly applied or not24 (1950: 1). 
An historical example that Carnap gives of  explication is the taxonomy of
sea  creatures  (1950:  5-7).  It  used  to  be  that  the  term  ‘fish’  applied  to  water
dwelling  creatures.  However,  (according  to  Carnap’s  story)  later  taxonomists
replaced the concept FISH, which applies to all water-dwellers, with the more
exclusive  concept  PISCES  (this  is  the  term  Carnap  uses  for  the  revised  fish
concept).  The  extension  of  PISCES,  unlike  that  of  FISH,  does  not  include
whales, dolphins, otters, clams, sea-slugs, jelly-fish (despite their primitive name),
and  manatees.  It  is  instead  limited  to  water  dwelling  animals  with  a  certain
shared ancestry; perhaps, though Carnap may not have thought this, PISCES is a
natural kind concept. The problem with FISH is that it is not particularly fruitful,
for example when it comes to making scientific predictions. PISCES beats FISH
in this regard. As we can make good predictions, e.g. if  something is a pisces then
it will be a vertebrate, it will live in water, it will have such-and-such genetics, etc.
24         An explication does not need to significantly revise the target concept. We could have an 
explicatum that specifies application conditions for the explicandum without deviating from it at 
all. In this way it would be extensionally identical to a traditional analysis of  a concept. An 
explicatum is distinguished from traditional analyses by its purpose, i.e. satisfying Carnap’s four 
criteria, rather than capturing the folk theory. It may well capture the folk theory, but we would 
have little reason to expect that any analysis would, for reason already stated.
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because it is largely defined by these properties. The only reliable prediction we
can make with the concept FISH is that its members will live in the water. The
criteria for a good explicatum are (1) that it be similar to the explicandum, (2)
that it be exact, (3) that it be fruitful, i.e. useful for making general statements
about the members of  the kind in question, and (4) that it be as simple as possible
(ibid). 
(As we have seen, the advantages that PISCES has over FISH fall under
the fruitfulness category, however a problem arises here concerning the exactness
of  FISH. Carnap states that in “a problem of  explication the datum, viz.,  the
explicandum, is not  given in exact terms;  if  it  were,  no explication would be
needed” (1950; 3-4). However FISH does seem to be an exact concept as the
corresponding bi-conditional shows:
x is a fish iff  x is a water-dwelling animal25
If  FISH indeed is an exact concept in this way then there is a way we can deal
with this. We can simply say that the explicandum in this case FISH is exact
however there is a concept that satisfies the other criteria more adequately i.e.
PISCES’s satisfaction of  fruitfulness.) An explanation is needed here of  the four
criteria.
Similarity
We can cash out similarity to the explicandum in a few different ways. 
Extension: Similarity between two concepts could be cashed out in terms
of  the  things  they  applied to.  If  the  two concepts  have a  significantly
overlapping extension then they would be similar. FISH and PISCES have
an  overlapping  extension  however  FISH  would  apply  to  many  more
25         This concept may not be exact, as there are some animals like hippos and penguins that 
spend long periods of  time inside and outside of  the water. Hence it may be vague as to whether 
they are in the extension of  FISH or not. However the solution I outline to this problem above I 
think would apply to any exact but imperfect folk concepts (like FISH). 
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animals. In fact the extension of  PISCES would make up only a small
percentage of  the extension of  FISH (in the actual world).
Purpose: Similarity could be cashed out in terms of  the theoretical work we
want the concept to do. For example, FISH and PISCES are similar in this
way because both are used for the taxonomy of  water dwelling creatures.
The difference is that PISCES is restricted to a particular type of  water
dwelling creature. This still seems like these two concepts have a bigger
similarity  in  purpose  than  if  one  was  for  taxonomising  land  dwelling
creatures.  
Definition:  Similarity  could  be  cashed  out  in  terms  of  the  application
conditions  the  two  concepts  share.  For  example  BITCH  is  similar  to
VIXEN in that  both share the necessary conditions ‘being female’  and
‘being a canine’. However the difference is that VIXEN also builds in the
condition ‘being a fox’. FISH and PISCES are not definitionally similar at
all, apart from water dwelling serving to fix the referents of  PISCES.  
Exactness
Carnap states that the rules for a explicatum’s use must be exact. I take him to
mean that the rules for the use of  the explicatum must be consistent and must
have a more determinate extension over possible situations than the explicandum.
This way we would be  able to say with relative certainty  whether or  not  the
concept is correctly applied. There should, for example, be very few obscure cases
where it is indeterminate whether the concept can be applied or not.
Fruitfulness
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The fruitfulness here Carnap says consists in the concept being useful for making
many  universal  statements.  This  needs  expanding.  The  examples  of  fruitful
universal  generalizations  that  Carnap  uses  are  scientific  laws  and  logical
theorems. Take the made up concept SKEG. The criteria for falling under this
concept are that one be a human who is both ten feet tall and five feet tall at the
same  time.  We  can  make  lots  of  universal  statements  using  SKEG,  e.g.  ‘no
chimpanzee  is  a  SKEG,  ‘no  human is  a  SKEG’,  ‘all  skegs  are  human’,  etc.
However,  these  universal  statements  are  not  useful  in  any  way.  So  a  further
qualification  must  be  that  the  concept  be  useful  for  making  good universal
generalizations. 
What Carnap has in mind when he talks about fruitfulness seems to be
related  to  logical  or  empirical  sciences;  he  does  not  seem  to  include  any
considerations on what would constitute fruitfulness for a philosophical concept
(no doubt this is because of  his overall project). I would say that in the case of
philosophical concepts the most fruitful concepts will be one ones that give us
solutions to location problems. I will elaborate on this later on in the chapter.
Simplicity
Carnap does not expand on the notion of  simplicity. I think it in part is that our
definition  should  be  as  short  as  possible,  unnecessary  clauses  would  not  be
helpful  at  all.  I  also  take  the  simplicity  of  a  concept  to  partly  consist  in  its
naturalness.  Which  means  that  we  should  not  in  our  definition  include
gerrymandered properties. These should generally be avoided, for example, we
could  define  a  joey  as  an  infant  marsupial,  but  we  could  also  get  the  same
intension by defining it as a 'schminfant' (infant and (either infant or adult but not
both)) 'schmarsupial'  (marsupial and (either marsupial or feline but not both)).
This gives us the same class of  creatures, but does it through dubious properties,
which are less fundamental than 'infant' and 'marsupial' because of  their reliance
on disjunctions with other properties like 'feline'.
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The  more  fundamental  the  properties  we  use,  the  more  effective  our
ontological reduction. Part of  the rationale for ontological reduction is the project
of  being able to have a class of  entities on which the existence of  all other entities
supervenes. For Jackson this would be the physical vocabulary. If  we define our
concepts  with  using  gerrymandered  properties  we  are  just  adding  in  steps  it
would take to effectively reduce the  concept to,  for example,  the  language of
physics. 
Explication and the Canberra plan
Before we go on to explicitly reply to Williamson's argument against conceptual
analysis  it  will  be  helpful  to  show  how  the  Canberra  plan  and  Carnapian
explication complement and differ from each other. Recall that Jackson holds that
many problems in philosophy can be described as location problems, the problem
of  where  the  Xs  are.  The  process  of  solving  these  problems  is  a  form  on
ontological reduction called serious metaphysics. I largely agree with Jackson in
this. However, as we have seen, the analyses his largely descriptive framework
provides  are  susceptible  to  Williamson’s  objection.  I  shall  wait  until  the  next
section to explicitly show how explication gets over these problems, but for now I
will say getting over these problems is an advantage the Canberra planner gets
from adopting a form of  explication. The following are two ways that I think
show how Carnapian explication and the Canberra plan can mesh with each
other.
Explication  makes  solving  location  problems  easier:  Carnap  himself  was
famously opposed to metaphysics, and he most likely introduced explication with
his overall project in mind. However, this is not to say that explication could not
be separated from Carnap’s overall project. In fact, Carnapian explication can be
very  useful  for  what  Jackson  calls  serious  metaphysics  i.e.  conceiving  of  the
world in a limited number of  ingredients. Consider Jackson's entry by entailment
thesis. This states that the existence of  certain things is entailed by an account of
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the world. If  we define a joey as an infant marsupial then the existence of  an
infant marsupial entails the existence of  a joey. Whether or not the existence of  X
is entailed by an account of  the world is dependent on the definition we have for
X. As explication allows us a lot of  leeway in constructing a definition of  X, we
would also have more leeway in showing where Xs are located. In this way there
may be various ways of  solving philosophical problems. A reductive explication
would  simply  be  an  explication  of  some  concept  in  an  ontologically  more
fundamental vocabulary. 
It  is  not  necessary  for  an  explicatum  that  it  be  readily  reducible.  As
Carnap states:  “The only essential requirement [for an explicatum] is that the
explicatum be more precise that the explicandum” (1963: 936). However, as the
possibility  of  solving  location  problems  is  one  of  the  main  advantages  of
explication,  an  explicatum  that  was  not  reducible  would  seem to  not  go  far
enough. An example could be the stating of  exact application conditions for a
concept where the application conditions make reference to mystical properties.   
Reflection  on  possible  cases  could  help  us  explicate  concepts:  For  Jackson,
reflection on possible cases is part of  defining our subject. If  we find a possible
situation  where  our  analysis  produces  unintuitive  results  then  our  analysis  is
defective. As we have shown, an explication does aim at producing a new concept
that is similar to the explicandum, so reflection on possible cases would serve the
purpose  of  elucidating  the  folk  theory  in  both  the  Canberra  plan  and  in
explication.  However,  as  we have seen,  an explicatum must  also satisfy  other
criteria. Reflection on possible cases could also serve an important purpose by
refining these other criteria.  It might be that an explicatum may seem fruitful
when we  consider  actual  cases;  however  it  may be  that  in  possible  cases  the
definition  is  not  fruitful.  We  may,  for  instance,  want  a  concept  of  personal
identity to govern our personal relations, our social institutions of  reward and
punishment, our debts that we incurred many years ago, etc. But there may be a
rather  large  collection of  possible  situations  where  our  definition  of  personal
identity does not do this. In this way it may serve us well to revise our definition.
To illustrate all this we can posit a revised version of  Nolan’s Canberra
‘two-step’ that explicitly takes inspiration from Carnapian explication:
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(a) We define the subject by gathering our platitudes about the Xs and using
them  to  elucidate  our  folk  concept  (the  explicandum)  of  the  Xs.  If  the
concept  is  inadequate,  then we would posit  a  replacement concept which
adequately satisfies Carnap’s four criteria (the explicatum).
(b) We look in the world for something that satisfies the role of  the explicatum
of  X;  we find  out  whether  our  description  of  the  Xs  is  made  true  by a
description in a more fundamental vocabulary.  
Call this the Carnapian two-step26. As we can see, the main difference between
this and the original version is in the detail included in the first step. Whilst the
first is less specific when it comes to the regimentation of  our platitudes into a
theoretical  role,  the  second  version  has  clear  criteria  of  what  counts  as  an
acceptable analysis. The second version seems to be more liberal with what may
count as an analysis of  X because of  it being able to go beyond near-realisers;
however  the  Carnapian  analysis  would  presumably  be  more  definitely
formulated.  
One difference between the Carnapian two-step and the original is in the
way  they  respectively  treat  counterexamples.  A  few  sections  ago  we  drew  a
distinction  between  those  counterexamples  which  are  situations  where  an
analysis  is  inadequate because it  is  not  a strict  analysis  of  the concept as we
employ  it  (type-1s)  and  those  which  count  as  counterexamples  because  the
analysis fails to meet other criteria related the purpose of  our analysis (type-2).
Both the Canberra and Carnapian two-step are open to type-1s,  for they both
require a degree of  similarity to the target concept, but they carry less weight for
the Carnapian version. This is because the criteria other than similarity to the
explicandum  may  act  as  counterweights  for  the  Carnapian  two-step;  if  an
explicatum fulfils the other criteria (fruitfulness, exactness and simplicity) then it
may still be a good analysis. Observe how the two methods would differently treat
Dennett's account of  intentional states. A type-1 counterexample to this theory,
for  instance,  themostats  believing the  room is  too hot  ,  would be  a lot  more
serious if,  like the Canberra planner, we were trying to keep close to our folk
26 Though, Carnapian explication should not be restricted to this two step. This two-step is 
essentially just Carnapian explication with answering location problems being part of  the 
criteria for a fruitful and simple analysis.
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concept.  However,  if  we  were  trying  to  explicate  intentionality,  then  the
unintuitiveness of  Dennett's account would be weighed up against its simplicity,
exactness,  and  fruitfulness.  Both  methods  would  take  seriously  type-2
counterexamples, such as when the explicatum seems simple but which we would
have to posit epicycles for it to work across certain cases. An example could be
that  Dennett’s analysis  of  what constitutes  a  true believer may work just  fine
across everyday cases, however, in the case of  strangely behaving aliens we would
have to identify their beliefs with erratic patterns of  behaviour. We may not be
able to predict the way they will act simply by taking the intentional stance to
them;  it  would  require  other  work  as  well.  However,  because  the  Canberra
Planner's  primary aim is  in giving an analysis  of  our  folk-concept,  then they
would not take this counterexample as seriously as would the Carnapian. 
In essence, the reason why Carnapian explication is not as susceptible to
counterexamples  as  Jackson's  method of  analysis  is  because of  their  different
purposes.  Capturing  the  folk  theory  is  less  of  a  flexible  goal  than  satisfying
Carnap’s four criteria. This is because of  the simple reason that if  an explicatum
does not satisfy one of  these criteria, then it may still be adequate because of  its
satisfaction  of  the  other  three  criteria.  Furthermore,  there  may  be  numerous
analyses  we  could  choose  from,  which  all  satisfy  Carnap's  four  criteria  to
differing extents. However, if  our purpose is primarily to capture the folk theory
then if  we do not do that our analysis is unsuccessful. There is also a sense in
which capturing the folk theory is a much harder task than constructing a concept
that,  for  example,  can  easily  be  reduced  to  more  fundamental  concepts  (not
merely because philosophers have been trying to capture folk concepts for years
to  no  avail).  The  ordinary  conception  of  something  is  spread  across  many
different minds, across a large area, may not directly investigated by someone,
and would most likely change gradually with time. Revising a concept so it can be
reduced  to something more fundamental, however, seems much easier if  we are




Williamson argues that we should have no reason to believe that we will ever get
a successful analysis of  a philosophically interesting concept, because we have
been trying for years to no avail.
Of  course in order to assess Williamson’s argument we would have to see
what  would  constitute  a  successful  analysis.  It  seems  that  for  Williamson  a
successful  analysis  would  be  one  that  specifies  the  necessary  and  sufficient
conditions for the application of  a concept as it is; one which is not open to type-
1 counterexamples.
I agree with Williamson in a sense: I do not that that we have succeeded
in decomposing many (if  any) interesting philosophical concepts in this manner.
However, this is not our only criterion for a successful analysis. Recall, that type-1
counterexamples are ones showing that our analysis does not gel with our folk
theory. If  our analysis does not primarily aim to capture the folk theory then
these kinds of  counterexamples will not be fatal to our analysis. One consequence
of  the Carnapian picture is that there is no one correct explication of  a concept.
A successful explication is one where we replace an inexact concept with an exact
one that meets our four criteria to a satisfactory degree. There may be various
ways in which we can do this; some of  which are better for different purposes
than  others.  And  if  we  interpret  previous  efforts  to  analyse  philosophical
concepts as explications, no doubt, some of  them will be successful in this regard.
Some may be lacking in certain areas but do so well in other areas that they may
be regarded as successful. Consider the amount of  analyses of  concepts that have
been largely discarded because of  intuitions about possible cases. Many of  these
may actually be successful because of  the way they satisfy the other criteria. In
this way we cannot really say that the history of  conceptual analysis is a history
of  failure; it has perhaps only failed to produce decompositions of  concepts, not
analyses in the wide sense. 
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The deflationary argument revisited 
The deflationary argument says that the choice between different analyses of  a
concept is a merely verbal one. So to argue over analyses would be pointless in
the same way as a verbal dispute would be. Let's analyse this claim. Recall the
definition of  verbal disputes we endorsed in the last chapter:
A dispute over S is broadly verbal when, for some expression T in S, the parties
use (or are disposed to use) T in different ways, and the dispute over S arises
wholly in virtue of  this divergence in the usage of  (or the disposition to use) T
(2011: 522).
The verbalness of  the dispute comes from the way in which it arises; specifically,
from linguistic divergence between the disputants. That mere verbal disputes arise
in  this  way  is  also  the  source  of  their  nonsubstantiveness,  as  usually  the
disputants  will  be  trying  to  answer  a  first-order  question  and  mere  linguistic
divergence would not appropriate for grounding this type of  dispute. 
This point is relevant because it leads to this question: In virtue of  what
could a  dispute  between two conceptual  analysts  be  substantive?  In  a  merely
verbal dispute, the dispute is nonsubstantive because of  the disputants believing
there is something deeper to their dispute than a mere choice of  words. In this
way, the charge against the conceptual analysts would perhaps be that they are
not self-conscious about what would ground possible disputes they would have.
They would think that there is something more to the question of  the application
conditions for a concept X, than the mere use of  words. So perhaps conceptual
analysts would mistakenly act as if  something more than just the use of  words
grounds  their  disputes,  and  this  would  be  the  source  of  their  method's  mere
verbalness.
This may not be a correct way to view the Canberra plan however. I doubt
that many Canberra planners take themselves to be uncovering anything more
than our conceptual structure with their analyses (and of  course, if  those analyses
are realised). Then the questions they would be seeking to answer would be better
described as wholly rather than merely verbal. As seen in the previous chapter, this
is  not  necessarily  a  vice.  Lexicographers  and linguists  would engage  in  these
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disputes  and  questions  as  part  of  their  role,  and  we  would  not  say  they  are
engaging  in  something  nonsubstantive.  Perhaps  then  the  conceptual  analyst
should be thought of  as a glorified lexicographer.
However,  the  objection may still  stand  that  there  is  perhaps  not  much
substantive that  hangs on the question of  what the folk concept is.  Chalmers
states: 
The language  and psychology of  philosophy are important topics in their own
right. But there is much more to philosophy than the language and psychology of
philosophy, and great care is required in moving from the latter to the former . . .
To  see  the  point,  note  that  the  mere  fact  that  existing  words  like  ‘know’  or
‘intentional’ or ‘see’ behave in a certain way does not suffice to settle substantive
disputes  about  epistemology,  action,  or  perception.  After  all,  views  based  on
these data may differ only verbally from views on which ‘know’ or ‘intentional’
or ‘see’ pick out something else and that endorse apparently different first-order
claims that use these words. (2011: 541).
The  Canberra  planner  may  or  may  not  be  happy  with  their  work  not  being
particularly  non-linguistically  substantive  in  this  way.  But  regardless,  when
endorsing  a  particular  near-realiser  of  a  folk-concept,  when others  are  in  the
vicinity, the Canberra planner would perhaps still face the charge of  arbitrariness.
They would be able to appeal to closeness to the folk theory in favour of  one
analysis if  there are others which are equally close.  
I think Carnapian explication gives the conceptual analyst a way out of
this  charge.  With  Carnapian  explication  the  choice  between  different  near-
realisers  (or  even  far-realisers)  would  be  less  arbitrary  than  if  our  primary
purpose,  in  analysing  concepts,  was  descriptive.  This  is  because  with  the
Carnapian view of  analysis, we have certain criteria which different analyses will
fulfil to differing extents. Even if  two explicata fulfil the similarity criterion to the
same extent, they differ when it comes to fulfilling the other criteria. What under
the Canberra system would be an arbitrary choice between near-realisers, could
become  a  more  substantive  one  when  we  judge  their  simplicity,  exactness,
fruitfulness,  and  similarity  to  the  explicandum.  The  fact  that  under  Carnap's
system we are not merely limited to near realisers—as we can balance similarity
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to the explicandum against the other criteria—also gives us a greater amount of
options when it comes to finding an explicatum. We may not find a near-realiser
of  a concept X that can perform the role we want it to, but a far-realiser may do.
This is opposed to the Canberra plan, where the lack of  a near-realiser entails
eliminativism about the folk-concept. In this way, for the Carnapian, the question
of  “what is X?” is not merely verbal, as for them the question can be paraphrased
as “Which explicatum fulfils the four criteria to the greatest extent?”
Problems for my account
My  account  is  perhaps  not  without  its  problems  and  I  anticipate  several
objections.  I  divide  them  into  objections  to  Carnapian  explication  itself  and
objections to my use of  it.
Objections to explication
Strawson’s Objection 
I  emphasised early  on in this  chapter  the  importance of  defining  the subject.
When we ask questions about beliefs, about knowledge, about free will, etc. our
questions are presumably framed within natural language and are concerned with
these things according to the ordinary conception. If  we show that, for example,
free will exists according to a rather different conception – but one that meets
Carnap’s four criteria – then can we really say that we have solved the original
philosophical problem? P. F. Strawson’s criticism centres around the claim that
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explicating  a  concept  of  philosophical  interest  by  replacing  it  with  a  more
scientific concept does not help us solve any philosophical problems. He states: 
It seems prima facie evident that to offer formal explanations of  key terms of
scientific  theories  to  one  who  seeks  philosophical  illumination  of  essential
concepts of  non-scientific discourse, is to do something utterly irrelevant—is a
sheer misunderstanding, like offering a text-book on physiology to someone who
says (with a sigh) that he wished he understood the workings of  the human heart.
(1963: 505).
It seems to require no argument to show that, in most cases, either the operation
(scientific language replacing non-scientific language) would not be practically
feasible or the result of  attempting it would be so radically different from the
original that it could no longer be said to be fulfilling the same purpose, doing the
same thing. (ibid)
If  these things are true, it follows that typical philosophical problems about the
concepts used in non-scientific discourse cannot be solved by laying down the
rules of  use of  exact and fruitful concepts in science. (1963: 506).
This is not merely Jackson’s worry about changing the subject. This is a worry
about changing the subject in a particular way, i.e. replacing a folk concept with a
scientific one. The purposes of  a scientific concept are presumably different from
that of  a folk one; scientific concepts are highly specialised whereas folk concepts
can be used for far wider purposes. For example, the language of  morality may
not have much use in science it is certainly very useful in everyday discourse. This
puts doubt upon Carnap’s response: 
A  natural  language  is  like  a  crude,  primitive  pocketknife,  very  useful  for  a
hundred different purposes.  But for certain specific purposes,  special  tools are
more efficient,  e.g.,  chisels,  cutting machines,  and finally the microtome .  .  .
[Strawson’s] thesis is like saying that by using a special tool we evade the problem
of  the correct use of  the cruder tool. But would anyone criticize the bacteriologist
for using a microtome, and assert that he is evading the problem of  correctly
using the pocketknife? (Carnap, 1963: 938-939).
Carnap’s response to Strawson is that natural language is broadly useful, but for
some purposes we need to use a more specialised system. I am assuming (in my
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terminology) he means that for some purposes our folk concepts (the explicanda)
are inadequate, and that we would need to replace them with more specialised
concepts (explicata).
However,  to  expand  upon  Carnap’s  analogy,  although  both  the
pocketknife and the microtome are cutting tools, in our investigation we may not
necessarily be interested in cutting. Strawson does not merely want to cut using
the pocketknife, he wants to investigate how the knife is used, the history behind
the knife, the connections it has to our other tools, etc. Strawson may want to
investigate  our  concepts  and  describe  them  because  they  are  interesting  in
themselves. This coheres with his focus in  Individuals on  descriptive  rather than
revisionary metaphysics. He states: “Descriptive metephysics is content to describe
the actual structure of  our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is
concerned  to  produce  a  better  structure”  (1959:  9).  Descriptive  metaphysics,
according  to  Strawson,  is  different  to  conceptual  analysis  in  that  the  aim of
descriptive metaphysics is far more general, “aiming lay bare the most general
features of  our conceptual structure” (1959: 9-10); this metaphysician does not
aim at making explicit the application conditions of  one concept, rather exposing
the whole structure underlying it. Regardless the aim is the same: capturing the
structure of  our thought in some way. 
I  see no problem with this other that the arguments against  traditional
conceptual analysis already raised. The way we use the crude pocketknife, or its
connections  to  other  tools,  may  be  interesting  in  themselves.  However  I  am
interested in finding tools which are better for cutting (cutting up reality that is!);
it would be strange to say that this is not a worthy aim as well. I want to find
fruitful and exact concepts that can play certain roles; the investigation into our
language on its  own is  interesting,  however  it  may not  give  us  an answer to
location problems (after all,  it is not beyond the realms of  possibility that our
concepts may be false, or inadequate in some way) which is what I am interested
in finding. The focus that Strawson puts on scientific language may also be unfair.
As Carnap points out, all that is  essential for the explicatum is that it be more
exact that explicandum. In this way we would not replace a pocket knife with
complex  machinery,  but  perhaps  with  a  different  pocket  knife  with  a  shaper
blade, a firmer handle and instructions for use. Many concepts of  philosophical
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interest would perhaps not be replaced by scientific ones. However, this does not
mean that we could not replace them with more simple, more exact, more fruitful
concepts. 
Objections to my account
Can explication really be considered a form of  analysis?
One objection that might be raised against my project is that explication is not a
form of  analysis. Consider analytic truths. Analytic truths are commonly taken to
be true  in virtue  of  meaning.  For  example,  “All  joeys  are  infant  marsupials”
would be an analytic truth on this picture; it follows from the definition of  the
target concept. This model of  analytic truth suggests the decompositional picture:
An analysis  of  a  concept  would  only  give  us  what  was  already  part  of  that
concept in the first place; what would follow from the meaning of  the concept
(this could of  course include the definition itself,  which seems to be what we
usually aim at articulating when we perform conceptual analysis). 
Explication does not seem to fit this conception of  analysis. Let’s say that
we explicated FISH into PISCES. Now as the only criteria for falling under FISH
is being a water-dwelling animal,  an explication of  this  concept that  excludes
otters, crabs, squids, etc. does not follow from the original concept, rather we
explicate in this  way because of  other considerations (e.g.  fruitfulness).  C. H.
Langford’s  statement  that  an  analysis  “states  an  appropriate  relation  of
equivalence” between what is analysed and that which does the analysing also
expresses a similar thought. He goes on to state that if  they “do not have the
same meaning, the analysis is incorrect” (1942: 323). However, I would say that
an  acceptable  explicatum  would  not  have  to  have  the  same  meaning  as  its
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explicandum. So how then can we consider explication a form of  analysis?
Beaney is  one commentator  who talks  about  explication as  a  form of
analysis. He states, for example that “In his later work Carnap talks of  analysis as
‘explication’” (2012). I think we have a better reason to think of  explication as
analysis than simply a deferral to certain peoples usage of  the word ‘analysis’
however. My reason for thinking that explication is a form of  analysis is because
it can play a very similar role to what we want analysis for in philosophy, as we
have shown. This role is essentially the making possible of  serious metaphysics;
the solving of  location problems.  When we factor in the fact that analysis has
been conceived of  in quite a few different ways, not merely as decomposition,
there seems to be little reason for explication not to be counted as a form of
analysis. Perhaps we can explicate analysis so that it includes explication in this
way. Explication should be counted as a form of  analysis because it  does the
same work we want analysis to do (it is similar to the explicandum), and it gives
us a way to solve location problems even if  the target concept has open texture (it
is fruitful). This explication of  analysis does not rely on circular reasoning. My
conclusion  that  explication  should  be  counted  as  a  form  of  analysis  is  not
contained in the premises. In order to perform an explication of  analysis we do
not need explication to be a form of  analysis itself. So arguing via explication that
analysis should include explication is not circular.
This  issue  may  simply  boil  down to  a  mere  verbal  dispute  over  what
'analysis' means. The point of  this essay could simply be that there is a method
rather like conceptual analysis which we can use to do a lot of  the work we want
conceptual  analysis to do and which avoids the arguments against conceptual
analysis. We should not be worried about whether we can call explication a form
of  analysis. All that matters is whether it can help us in serious metaphysics in a
similar  way  to  conceptual  analysis  and  whether  it  can  avoid  the  arguments
directed against conceptual analysis. I believe that I have shown that explication




In summary, my argument is, at its most basic, this: Williamson’s argument aim
to show that we should not expect a successful analysis because they always seem
to  be  open  to  counterexample.  Essentially  his  argument  depends  on  putative
analyses  being defeated by type-1 counterexamples.  A type of  the  conceptual
analysis that’s primary purpose is to analyse the folk conception of  a concept is
open to such counterexamples. These counterexamples are often fatal to such an
account.  Against  this  type of  conceptual  analysis  Williamson's  argument may
work. However, if  we change the purpose of  our analysis then we avoid these
sorts  of  counterexamples.  Carnapian explication allows us to  do this,  and so
without such powerful defeaters to an account we could perhaps achieve what
could  be  considered  successful  analyses;  in  this  case  such  analyses  would  be
explicatums  that  satisfy  Carnap’s  four  criteria.  As  we  can  produce  successful
analyses on this picture, Williamson's argument does not seem to hold up.
Carnapian explication can also get us over the deflationary objection. It is
true,  that  conceptual  analysis,  when  practised  in  the  right  way  (i.e.  without
getting ahead of  ourselves) is not a merely verbal enterprise (though it may be
wholly verbal). But, when analysing a folk-theory, we may run into the problem
of  equally near, but distinct realisers. Carnapian explication can help us get over
this  particular  problem,  as  there  are  other  criteria  than  similarity  to  the
explicandum that the distinct explicatums may satisfy to different extents.  For
example,  one  may  be  more  exact  than  the  other.  In  this  way,  Carnapian
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